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Abstract
This thesis explores the difference in adoption patterns of water recharge well
technology in Mexico City both by local entities and the central city government. The
research finds that this technology, originally designed by the central city with the
stated purpose of aiding aquifer recharge, was adopted by local entities driven by
concerns over flood control. Geophysical realities, complemented by political and
socioeconomic factors, are key in deciding the use and type of infiltration technology by
local entities. Water policy priorities at the local level are a decidedly local affair, which
makes coordination difficult and thus constitutes a challenge for sustainable water
management in Mexico City as a whole.
Ineffective formal coordination mechanisms among the three levels of government, and
the incentives that explain the uneven adoption of recharge wells by local communities,
suggest an alternative approach to metropolitan water governance. In addition to
traditional solutions such as regulation and formal metropolitan cooperation bodies, a
third path of sustainable water management would involve a division of tasks between
high and lower local level governments. Levels of government with the resources and
incentives to develop technologies with systemic impacts and that address immediate
needs can then "market" or "scale down" these solutions to localities whose incentive
structure would lead them to, in effect, implement these solutions. In this way, collective
action problems could be sidelined at the metropolitan scale.
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Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Terms
Conagua - National Water Commission
DF - Federal District, Mexico City's core, state-like authority
Delegacion - Local government of the DF akin to a municipality. Its plural form is
delegaciones
GAM - Gustavo A. Madero, one of the DF's delegaciones or local governments
GDF - DF government
ICA - Institutional collective action
INEGI - National Institute of Statistics, Geography and Information
IWRM - Integral Water Resources Management
OCAVM - Valley of Mexico Water Basin Body; Conagua's arm at the Valley of Mexico
level
PAI - Integrated action plan; system of wells within the Valley of Mexico Basin
PAN - National Action Party
PRD - Democratic Revolution Party
PRI - Revolutionary Institutional Party
SACM - Water System of Mexico City; institution charged with water policy at the DF
level
VMB - Valley of Mexico Basin
ZMVM - Metropolitan Area of the Valley of Mexico
Introduction
Water management has historically been a problem for Mexico City. While water is an
issue for many cities in the developing world, Mexico City faces some of its most
complicated challenges due to its particular geographical position. Established on a lake,
in a closed basin, the city has battled for various centuries with floods. More recently,
however, the growth in the population has led to an explosive demand for water that
the aquifer beneath the city is unable to satisfy.
As the nation's capital, Mexico City was able to marshal the resources necessary
to undertake immense engineering projects for both channeling the copious runoff out
of the valley and bringing fresh water from faraway basins. And yet the problems
remain: a 10% deficit in supply exists even as 35% of water is lost to leakage in the core
of the city; most stormwater runoff is pumped out of the valley even as episodic
flooding continues bedeviling the city, made worse by ground subsidence due to
overexploitation of the aquifer at a rate three times that of its natural recharge.
These water policy challenges grew even as important political transformations
entered the scene. In the last twenty years, democratization and decentralization have
transformed the Mexican political system. From the city's perspective, the demise of a
highly centralized regime meant the loss of key political and economic resources that
had been used to solve water problems using the traditional water management
paradigm: supply sided, technology intensive and centralized systems. At the same time,
local governments gained new responsibilities and resources, even in the case of the
still relatively centralized Mexico City. The subunits of Mexico City (delegaciones)l have
certainly increased their say and have become important actors for policy formulation
and implementation, including water policy.
Thus, water management in Mexico City can be thought of as a challenge that
intersects two of the most discussed concepts in planning literature in the past thirty
years, namely sustainability and decentralization in the framework of metropolitan
governance. On one hand, sustainability vis-A-vis water has become an unavoidable
1 Spanish words referred to repeatedly throughout the text, including delegacion, delegaciones and their
names will not be italiziced nor follow Spanish spelling.
concern when talking about the future of cities and, in water management, has found its
expression in the concept of Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM). On the
other hand, countries around the world, and especially in the developing world, have
embraced decentralization in their political systems as a way to increase accountability
and efficiency in the provision of public services. These two concepts have enormous
bearing one on the other. Paradoxically, just as greater coordination is demanded by the
need to take into account environmentally sound policies, entities across the globe find
themselves working with political frameworks that are quite fragmented. The process is
probably aggravated in the sprawling metropolis of the developing world, where
functional urban entities straddle many political units and a patchwork of institutions is
precariously trying to bring some coordination and order, under the guise of
metropolitan governance, to an extremely fluid urban environment.
It is in this context that a particular technology may play a central role in
showing the way forward with regard to water management in Mexico City: recharge
wells. Advocated by proponents of IWRM within the larger context of water infiltration
technologies, recharge wells have been built in certain delegaciones of Mexico City.
Indeed, their rise has coincided with the arrival of democratically elected officials to the
helm of these delegaciones. Their use, however, has not been uniform and it is not clear
exactly why the technology suddenly caught the eye of some delegaciones but not
others. The technology is mentioned every now and then in newspaper articles and
reports but government and academic treatment of the technology remain superficial.
This is especially striking given the advantages that at first sight recharge wells
have. They constitute a method for dealing with stormwater runoff, thus helping avoid
floods, while also allowing aquifer recharge by guiding water underground. Thus, it
partially closes water loops, a prime concern of IWRM, and as such represents a
technology that could be very useful in Mexico City's particular case, with moderate to
high rainfall, a naturally closed basin and an aquifer that is being depleted, creating
subsidence problems. Additionally, it is less space intensive than other infiltration
technologies, making it valuable in urbanized land. On the face of it, this technology
would represent a real sustainable alternative, though far from a unique solution, but its
use has been uneven.
A first question this thesis seeks to address is to understand the reasons for the
differences in adapting this technology by the central city government and different
delegaciones in Mexico City. There may be technical reasons or simple ad hoc reasons
(e.g., an administrator saw fit to pursue a recharge well strategy) why different
administrations approach the problem in different ways, but there is more here than
meets the eye. Indeed, the preliminary studies for this thesis showed a remarkable
pattern between disposable water and delegaciones that had decided to build recharge
wells:
Table 1. Comparison of delegaciones with most to least water
availability and originally reported recharge well figures
Recharge
wells
Delegacion I/c/d originally
reported by
delegaciones
CUAJIMALPA 507.07 0
CUAUHTEMOC 483.91 0
MIGUEL HIDALGO 480.22 0
BENITO JUAREZ 454.61 0
MAGDALENA CONTRERAS 417.79 0
ALVARO OBREGON 386.04 0
GUSTAVO A. MADERO 341.06 0
VENUSTIANO CARRANZA 339.64 0
AZCAPOTZALCO 327.48 0
IZTACALCO 317.8 233
COYOACAN 314.06 9
TLALPAN 250.86 55
IZTAPALAPA 239.38 170
MILPA ALTA 228.12 4
XOCHIMILCO 215.96 19
TLAHUAC 178.77 17
Source: Compiled by author with information from Davila and
Constantino, 2007; INEGI, 2005; and requests for public
information. Figures are for 2004 disposable water over
population of 2005. 1/c/d Liters per capita per day.
It was quite striking that the lower half of the delegaciones with disposable
water (water supplied, which includes leaks) were precisely those that had built these
infrastructures. Though a direct link would be difficult to establish and there are many
potential additional variables which will be explored, this information hints that the
planning and executing of certain sustainable technologies follows certain patterns not
completely determined by the whims of who is in charge of deciding water policies. This
is precisely what I mean by the contention of the key role recharge wells have in
studying water management for Mexico City. It is not that they constitute a panacea for
the woes of the metropolis, since different comprehensive water plans that call for their
use make it clear they can only function as part of a multipronged approach (Skaggs,
Vail and Shankle 2002; Burns, 2009). The importance of their study is that the process,
incentives and institutions which allowed their construction can show us how and why
sustainable technologies actually get implemented. This is the heart of the matter.
Comprehensive plans for sustainable water management in the city have been proposed
several times, until now with little success. Studying how one element actually gets
done or not done within the different delegaciones will reveal some of the most
important factors planners must take into account to get water management plans
moving along in the physically, socially and institutionally complicated environment of
Mexico City.
In order to accomplish this, the thesis also seeks to answer various questions
that will hint at the variables that have a bearing on patterns of adoption, including:
- How does this technology work and what does it do?
- Does it work better in certain conditions? This deals with technical and structural
reasons such as the usefulness of the technology itself, the level of urbanization
existing in a delegacion and other environmental and social conditions.
- What actors and motivations were involved in implementation? The technology
may have been used to address the demands of certain citizens; if so, what were
these demands and who were these groups? The technology may have also
"worked" for the delegacion, in as much as it addressed specific problems the
delegacion was intent on dealing with and it did so according to certain cost-benefit
considerations, not just economical but even political.
Thus, this thesis is framed by the competing pressures that sustainability,
decentralization and metropolitan governance might produce in an urban environment.
Many argue that decentralization gives actors the ability to become agents of urban
livability, able to come up with solutions to some of the most pressing problems of the
city. Yet this isn't done in random fashion; in fact, certain patterns and situations make
this implementation more or less probable.
My research touches directly on to what extent and under what conditions the
mechanisms to address sustainability issues are enhanced by decentralization. At the
same time, it must be kept in mind that this technology is far from being the solution to
Mexico City's water woes. As I mentioned, recharge wells constitute but a small portion
of things that must be done to address a perennially eminent water crisis. The thesis
will not only identify the mechanisms that allow localities to rise to the challenge of
sustainability, but will also address the larger issue of how scalable these solutions are
and consider, even, the possibility of innovation as counterproductive by allowing
potential hazardous unintended consequences to spread in the absence of a
metropolitan or centralizing agency.
This thesis will argue that very immediate and tangible benefits guided many of
the innovations, particularly as a response to centralized institutions which didn't
address problems sufficiently quickly. However, this does not mean the policies enacted
as a way to profit from their perceived benefits were completely ad hoc. Certain
patterns and consistencies in the cost-benefit analysis conducted by different actors can
be identified. Indeed, the physical environment is key, with infrastructure density and
flood intensity playing central roles. These geophysical realities are mediated by
organizational logics stemming from local political pressure, resource availabilitya, and
instances of informal cooperation. I have also found that the informal cooperation
between institutions that arises partly out of necessity to make progress on the water
issue may be an inefficient way to, in the end, address the question of sustainability and
the larger water problematic.
The research for the thesis drew from formal publications, requests for public
information from different government offices in Mexico City and through a series of
semi-structured interviews made in the course of June, July and August of 2009 with
persons in charge of water in the city government, at the federal level and in ten
delegaciones within the city. The thesis covers approximately the period of time
between 2000 and 2009, coinciding roughly with the arrival of elected representatives
to the delegaciones as well as the beginning of earnest plans to build recharge wells, and
ends recently with the end of the third delegacion administration (2006-2009) and the
publication, in August of 2009, of federal guidelines for the recharge of water into
aquifers.
Given the scope of the thesis, this study centers almost exclusively on local
government entities. It is true many more actors affect the decisions implemented
(namely private interests and NGO's), but it is the delegacion that finally takes the
decision to implement many of the policies that affect everyday life. Thus, centering on
them makes sense. It is also worth noticing that conditions within delegaciones are not
uniform and the way interventions are evaluated in one part of the jurisdiction may not
necessarily be the same. as in another. However, this level of aggregation, at the
delegacion level, presents enough detail for a worthwhile analysis, though a finer-
grained analysis could certainly be pursued in further research, with this dimension
briefly touched upon in some case studies.
The thesis begins with a literature review on decentralization, metropolitan
governance, and sustainable water policies and recharge technologies. Chapter 2
presents an overview of the general state and problems of Mexico City water policy at
the basin, metropolitan, and city levels, as well as the institutional maze that has made
coordination more difficult in the past decade. Chapter 3 is a brief account of how
clashes between state and national governments drove the DF (the state-like entity that
comprises the core governance structure of Mexico City) to try recharge wells. This in
turn sets up Chapter 4, which offers an introduction to recharge wells in Mexico City's
delegaciones, how they have been used and what is meant by that term in the different
delegaciones, and posits some of the first incentives for these delegaciones to even
consider investing in them. It then analyzes the different interviews for the delegaciones
and tries to cobble together the requisites that make for a successful implementation of
recharge wells at the delegacion level and how that differs from the citywide level.
Chapter 5 will offer concluding remarks on the delegacion approaches and lessons that
can be gleamed from them, as well as offer suggestions on how water policy should
bring together different political units in the city.
Chapter 1. Decentralization, metropolitan governance, and the sustainable
management of urban water
The last forty years have seen the rise of two concepts that have guided important
debates on public policy around the world: decentralization and sustainability. Both
concepts are routinely praised, but it's not entirely clear how they influence each other.
Many argue decentralization engenders closer contact with citizens, allowing their
demands to be more swiftly attended to, but what exactly is the nature of these
demands? Will solving their problems just displace an environmental problem by, for
example, moving downstream pollution or sewage that used to affect people in a
locality? Is decentralization compatible with the geographical level of control needed to
internalize environmental hazards? In sum, how does one scale sustainability
challenges, especially environmental sustainability? Indeed, this challenge might seem
even harder at the metropolitan scale, where the continuous search for effective
governance mechanisms, whether through metropolitan authorities or "polycentric
models," provides an example of the difficult task of reconciling the demands inherent
in these concepts.
In this chapter, brief insight into these questions from the literature will be
provided. This will serve to illuminate Mexico City's case, which faces challenges that
are similar to those around the world and serve as a framework in chapter 2 when
discussing the institutional problems facing water management in that city.
1.1 Decentralization and metropolitan structures
Decentralization has had ardent defenders since the middle of the last century,
borrowing from the seminal works of Tiebout (1956) and Oates (1972). However, its
implementation as government policy, especially for developing nations, boomed
during the 1980s. The key idea behind decentralization lies in the fact that it allows
government to be better tailored to its constituents' demands. This argument takes
several shapes: the existence of several entities which can set different tax policies will
allow citizens to change residence to that place which best satisfies their preferences for
a different tax-expenditure mix; alternatively, decentralization will allow authorities to
satisfy the preference of their constituencies and retain them in their regions. In
addition, this tailored fit is also induced by a reduction in information problems, since
authorities are closer to the actual place where citizen demands are formulated and
projects implemented, reducing the agent-principal problem (Ostrom, Schroeder and
Wynee, 1993).
However, critics of decentralization have noted that decentralization may bring
with it problems of externalities that can't be dealt with at certain levels (Proud'homme,
1995). It is fair to point out that many supporters of decentralization, including
originally Tiebout (1961) and Oates (1972), have also noticed this problem and
consequently agree certain tasks should be carried out by central or higher-level
governments. In addition to externalities that may be inefficiently addressed, empirical
studies have also dealt with the lack of capacity that may be faced by lower-level
governments, leading central government to, paradoxically, take on new tasks (Tendler,
1997). Other concerns involve the concept of a "race to the bottom:" the need to attract
investment or taxpayers forces entities to reduce or soften key regulations that may
protect the environment or the welfare of their citizens (Sigman, 2007; Sellers and
Hoffmann-Martinot, 2009). Finally, some authors have noted that Tiebout's original
conception may lead to homogeneous communities, segregation, and eventually an
increase in disparity between communities since those that began with a better
endowment of resources may continue attracting a higher-income population, while
other communities languish (Howell-Moroney, 2008).
Interestingly enough, corruption can cut both ways, since it is not evident in
which institutional configuration it would be minimized. While low accountability to
citizens would allow many opportunities for wrongdoing; from an organizational point
of view, decentralization, especially coupled with democratization as was the case in
Mexico, may increase the autonomy of local entities and especially of their executives
(Wilson, 1989), which, when not accompanied by strong local oversight mechanisms,
can result in corruption or authoritarian enclaves (Grindle, 2007).
Decentralization arguments have usually gone hand in hand with debate
regarding the "best" metropolitan government structure. Arguments essentially mimic
those for and against decentralization, with discussions between the polycentric model,
involving multiple horizontal authorities over a single metropolitan area (Ostrom,
Tiebout and Warren, 1961) and consolidated models in which metropolitan authorities
can internalize the different spillovers generated by a city (Sharpe, 1995). In reality, a
continuum of types can be said to exist, ranging from unique metropolitan authorities to
horizontal entities that have some coordination through strictly voluntary associations,
to everything in between (Cuadrado-Roura and Fernandez Guell, 2008).
Historically, the nature of metropolitan government has varied considerably,
with certain trends being evident. Consolidation was tried especially at the end of the
nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries (e.g. New York, Barcelona), but the
continuous growth of urban areas has made this option unfeasible (Gottmann, 1995;
Wheeler, 2000). During the 60s, especially in western Europe and the United States,
there was a movement to create metropolitan structures which would coordinate many
of the services and regulations that crossed political boundaries. Sandwiched between
local governments and state or national ones, which guarded their turf jealously, many
of these institutions were eventually dismantled in the late 70s and 80s (Sharpe, 1995).
Nowadays the picture worldwide is quite diverse. Metropolitan authorities have been
reestablished in certain cases (for example, the Greater London Authority) but with
more limited functions. The dominant approach has mostly been ad-hoc with "variable
scales of intermunicipal cooperation" for specific services via contracts, special-purpose
units with powers over a particular service, and many other arrangements. (Sellers and
Hoffmann-Martinot, 2009, p 269). For an excellent review on the present state of
metropolitan structures and decentralization in general around the world, see World
Bank and United Cities and Local Governments (2009).
In this context of multiple authorities at the metropolitan level for most of the
cities on the planet, defenders of the polycentric model have sought to study
mechanisms which might allow cooperation to emerge. Ostrom, Schroeder and Wynee
(1993) showed indigenous institutions allowing cooperation. In metropolitan contexts,
proponents of institutional collective action (ICA) argue that cooperation among
horizontal government entities is possible given the right circumstances (Feiock, 2004;
Post, 2004). Essentially, ICA says that when costs from externalities arising from a
metropolitan problem are high enough, stakeholders will have an incentive to establish
cooperative mechanisms to deal with these problems, especially if transaction costs are
low, if there is trust among parties, and an established third party (such as a state
government) can help enforce the agreements. Of course, this view is subject to
criticism, since it may be only with catastrophes, especially with regard to public goods
that are diffuse (an aquifer, for example), when the costs of non-cooperation will be
high enough for authorities to cooperate.
In any case, decentralization and metropolitan governance have a bearing on
important topics, including environmental themes and, chief among them, water.
Indeed, it is illustrative that one of the seminal papers on metropolitan government
structure (Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren, 1961), gives the example of Los Angeles
metropolitan area municipalities importing water as a "long-term solution" that
required informal arrangements. to apportion the water. Indeed, the solution put
forward by this metropolitan arrangement simply displaced the problem, without
solving it, and actually increased the negative externalities suffered by different
communities in California, as is readily acknowledged today (Reisner, 1993).
Thus, it is important to turn to the problem of sustainability, specifically focused
on water. This discussion will go over some of the key concepts regarding sustainable
use of water and include a presentation on technologies that seem to address specific
issues on that topic, in particular infiltration technologies.
1.2 Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) and stormwater/recharge
technologies
Discussions on sustainability with regard to water invariably involve the concept
of Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM). IWRM seeks to apply sustainable
principles to the management of water, including taking into account the social,
economic and environmental spheres key to sustainability. A frequently cited definition
of IWRM, for which a consensus doesn't yet exist, is that IWRM constitutes "a process
which promotes coordinated development and management of water, land and related
resources, in order to maximize the resultant economic and social welfare in an
equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems" (GWP-
TAC, 2000, p. 22). The term evolved from the principles set forth in 1992 at the
International Conference on Water and the Environment in Dublin, and usually
describes initiatives that seek to close water loops within river basins, which is an area
of analysis that can account for most of the externalities dealing with water. These ideas
challenge the technical paradigm of the beginning of the twentieth century, defined by
supply-side treatment and disposal without regard for conservation and recycling
(Vlachos and Braga, 2001; Daigger, 2009). Some authors further put forward the
concept of Sustainable Urban Water Management (Vlachos and Braga, 2001; Van de
Meen, Brown and Farelly, 2009), but this is basically the application of IWRM to urban
settings.
The advent of IWRM has been able to capture the essence of many technologies
and initiatives in the developing and developed world which challenge the traditional
paradigm. This traditional paradigm can be perfectly seen in the account of the
development of water supply systems in cities offered by Morris, Lawrence and Foster
(1997). According to these authors, water demand for many urban centers begins by
being satisfied through the exploitation of a central aquifer. As an urban population
grows, the use of this source is increasingly more costly, either because water tables
decline or because the presence of the city increases the pollution of the aquifer. As a
result, the exploitation of the aquifer moves to periurban well fields, which suffer the
same fate as population grows into this zone. Finally, the city decides to import surface
water from other basins to satisfy its needs. This arc is, in a nutshell, what supply-side,
centralized approaches to water have been in the world up until very recently.
Of course, this traditional approach is particularly ill fit for a fast growing
metropolis in the developing world, due to its costs and diseconomies. Thus we find the
spectacle in many developing world cities, particularly in areas of high rainfall, of
flooded streets even as the population experiences water shortages (U.N.-Habitat,
2005). Thus it is not surprising alternatives are being proposed and developed, with the
economies of decentralized and alternative sources even being explored by institutions
such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD; 2009).
It is in this context that infiltration technologies have been proposed as part of an
IWRM strategy, allowing for rainwater or other types of water (including treated water
or allocations from rivers) to recharge aquifers and eventually serve as part of the
supply. This technology has existed in one form or another since the beginning of the
twentieth century as a way of dealing with urban runoff (Remmler and Hfitter, 1997).
Artificial recharge of aquifers, through any of its many forms, also has some precedents
as examples of its use can be found since the middle of the twentieth century in Long
Island (De Lbe and Lukovich, 2004). More recently, it has been explored in especially
water-constrained regions of the United States, such as Arizona and Southern California
(Johnson and Finlayson, 1994), as well as Australia (Dillon, Toze and Pavelic, 2007),
among many other places.
In general, aquifer recharge technologies exhibit a tradeoff between amount of
area needed and how much pretreatment the water requires. At one end of the
spectrum, infiltration basins take a great amount of area and the water that infiltrates
requires less treatment, since part of the filtration process will occur naturally by
simple percolation. In developed countries, procedures usually involve water flowing
through settling ponds or wetlands to clean it, previous to entering infiltration basins.
At the other end of the spectrum there are injection wells, which, as their name implies,
inject water directly to the aquifer by pumping it. This technology requires water to be
treated to drinking quality standards and is usually used in areas where the aquifer has
a confining or semi-confining (impermeable) layer that must be cut through. In this
sense, recharge wells (also known as vadose zone wells or gravity injection wells)
constitute a midway point. Usually between 30 and 40 meters deep and filled with
permeable material, they are excavated to reach a more permeable strata and allow
more water to flow into aquifers. At the same time, the water used for these wells must
have solids removed since they are prone to clogging (a lifespan of between five and
twenty years is estimated for these structures). Recharge trenches operate according to
a similar concept though they are usually just a few meters deep (Kresic, 2009; UNEP,
2004; Johnson and Finlayson, 1994).
Figure 1. Recharge Technologies
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Source: Reproduced from UNEP, 2004.
These technologies can be used in urban areas to simultaneously deal with
stormwater runoff and recharge the aquifer below the city. Indeed, that is the purpose
of the recharge wells we will be exploring in the case of Mexico City. That said, the use of
these devices or any of their many variations (U.N.-Habitat, 2005) in urban settings has
concerned hydrologists due to potential pollution effects on the groundwater (Howard
et al., 2007; Ellis, 1997; Watkins, 1997). Indeed, in most developed countries there are
requirements that infiltration structures found in urban areas have stormwater treated
in some way or another before being directed underground. Not only is this an
environmental concern but it also helps in the upkeep of the structures. Certainly one of
the critiques of recharge wells in particular are the high levels of failure, generally due
to clogging, which may reduce their effective life to five years (Ellis, 1997). That said,
research continues to improve this technology, even by incorporating filters in the body
of a well, as has been done by Canadian researchers (Dillon, Toze and Pavelic, 2007).
These infiltration technologies constitute a step in the direction of IWRM,
especially as it pertains to environmental sustainability. By dealing with stormwater
runoff and at the same time profiting it to allow recharge of the water table, a more
intelligent use of water resources is being accomplished (Parkinson and Mark, 2005).
The question, however, becomes, who will implement these innovations? If developing
world cities badly need alternative water management strategies, can this be done in
the context of a polycentric metropolis?
1.3 Urban sustainability reexamined
In discussions about sustainability, there tends to be agreement on the importance of
the local level, and of local initiatives, to begin addressing the needs of sustainability
(Marcotullio and McGranahan, 2007; Evans et al., 2005). However, it is not clear how
this focus on the locality interacts with the institutional structures that define
decentralization and polycentric models more broadly. Indeed, one of the challenges of
sustainability is the displacement of urban environmental burdens (McGranahan,
2007), a prime example being the import of freshwater to cities from faraway basins
implicit in the traditional water management model. The displacement of
environmental burdens finds its economic model counterpart in the concept of
"negative externalities" which, as we have seen, constitutes the prime issue over which
defenders and detractors of metropolitan government models argue.
In this discussion bringing together metropolitan government structures and
sustainable water management, it is useful to mention the concept of urban
environmental transitions (McGranahan, 2007), which constitutes a variation on the
idea of the environmental Kuznet curve. The environmental Kuznet curve is a
hypothesis according to which, as a society becomes wealthier, its pollution levels and
environmental problems will increase at first, but eventually decrease. This pattern
would point to an inverted U-shaped curve. (Figure 2). Various empirical studies have
sought to test the validity of the environmental Kuznet curve with very mixed results.
The alternative proposed by the urban environmental transitions model introduces
spatial levels to the analysis.
Figure 2. Environmental Kuznet curve
Wealth
Accordingly, and following McGranahan (2007), while local environmental
burdens are reduced uniformly as wealth increases, regional environmental concerns
first increase and then are followed by an eventual decrease. For example, increased
household access to water and its concomitant health benefits (very local level)
generally increase monotonically with wealth. However, negative effects on a basin
increase as wastewater discharge and freshwater supply enlist resources basinwide (as
a result of a region becoming wealthier), but eventually decrease with creation of
wastewater treatment facilities and policies to conserve water. Finally, at the global
scale we will see increased environmental burdens, generally of a diffused kind, as
wealth increases. A typical example is global warming due to increased consumption,
which contributes to carbon emissions (Figure 3).
Figure 3. Urban environmental transition
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Source: Adapted from McGranahan (2007).
Critiques have been made of this model, including the difficulty in defining some
of the features. Questions raised include what constitutes an environmental burden and
how wealth should be measured-is it countrywide or at the level of the individual?
(Connolly, 2007). That said, the model does provide a useful framework to explore,
especially if we are interested in how decentralization interacts with sustainability.
The question, then, is whether the decentralized model that has been adopted
around the world will allow actors to come up with the solutions needed to confront
environmental concerns. Indeed, hydrologists worried about urban groundwater
systems uniformly call for incorporating basinwide policies (Carmon and Shamir, 1997;
Howard, 1997), which in many cases involve coordination between different entities. If
this coordination can't be effectively pursued or is sought only when the environmental
costs have reached critical proportions (which would follow, for example, from the ICA
analysis of metropolitan governance), then it is worth examining how incentives and
structures can be better managed at the metropolitan level to "turn the curve," as
McGranahan (2007) puts it.
For that author and others (Wheeler, 2000), politics is key in whether or not, and
when, the curve can be turned downward. An example drawn from history would be the
establishment of the first water treatment plant for supply in Philadelphia at the turn of
the twentieth century. It took that city nearly ten years to begin the construction of a
filtration plant due to corruption and political squabbles (Cutler and Miller, 2004). In a
similar fashion, as we will see in the next chapter, the project for treating most of
Mexico City's wastewater had been on the drawing board since the mid-1990s, but it
wasn't until 2010 that the project actually broke ground. Thus, political and economic
actors play a central role.
It is precisely those actors that can have such an impact on decisions within a city
to which some have looked in search of factors affecting urban "livability." These agents
make cities not only "growth machines," but also places where sustainable practices
allow livelihoods to be reproduced (Evans, 2002). These actors may exist at different
levels, from international non-government organizations (NGOs) to national political
parties, citizen organizations and even different government entities. Local
governments have a particularly delicate task, since they are many times the key to
implementation and can certainly hinder or promote sustainability measures (Evans et
al., 2005).
From an organizational perspective, if decentralization is coupled with
democratization (as occurred in the case of Mexico), this could mean that different
executives in local governments will arrive on the scene after each election.
Organization literature considers that innovations within an organization are usually
more easily initiated by executives within the organization (Wilson, 1989; Light, 1998;
Kelman, 2005); thus,.we can speculate that implementation of innovations like the ones
demanded by IWRM, and of which recharge wells constitute our case study, are more
likely in a democratized, decentralized context. However, this doesn't necessarily mean
that the implementation of solutions will be all-around sustainable by the mere fact of
being in local government units, which, after all, have to respond to constituencies that
may have quite local interests in mind. Indeed, decentralization may favor the solution
of problems in the "local" curve of urban environmental transitions, but have a harder
time allowing for solutions at the city-regional scale, especially in a context of
polycentrism where the benefits of sustainable solutions may not be apparent to
localities unless a systemic crisis prompts them to action.
The solution for the intersection between decentralization, as promoted in the
developing world since the 80s, with sustainability (and IWRM in particular) does not
have a single answer. Though many actors have a say in the running of the metropolitan
system, the local authorities within it face particular pressures, since implementation is
often local while the appropriate framework for thinking about sustainable solutions
can be at the metropolitan or regional level. Local entities don't necessarily have the
incentive to think about that level, so the search for "intergovernmental incentive
frameworks" (Wheeler, 2000, p. 140) continues. The exploration of water management
in Mexico City in the following chapters will touch upon many of these themes.
Recharge wells, in particular, constitute an interesting case. As we've seen, they
serve multiple purposes in water management, are consistent with IWRM and are being
implemented by some of the delegaciones within the city. The explanation for this will
illuminate not only what could be done better in Mexico City, but also what types of
structures and incentives would allow for a decentralized model to meet the demands
for sustainable urban water management.
Chapter 2. Mexico City's water situation - Institutions, numbers, plans and
policies
As we have seen in the literature on metropolitan governance in Chapter 1, a key factor
of effective governance is finding the appropriate institutional channels (in any of the
multiple existing arrangements) that can deal effectively with policy questions that
transcend political boundaries. In the case of water, we have seen that integral water
resource management (IWRM) has made the watershed or basin the key domain of
analysis by lending itself to account for all the externalities of human use and disposal
of water, since basins account for most of the water cycle within their physical
boundaries. Hydrologists even urge planners to consider the basin in three-
dimensionally, taking into account groundwater flows when making land use decisions
(Howard, 1997).
Mexico City, of course, faces many of the challenges described by the literature
we have reviewed. While this thesis has as its area of research the core area of Mexico
City, comprised by the Distrito Federal (DF), and within it centers on ten of the sixteen
delegaciones that compose it, it is necessary to take a step back and give an overview of
the entire system in which these local governments operate. The study of recharge wells
within the delegaciones has to keep in mind how these wells fit within the metropolitan
context, not only as a matter of governance but in terms of the impact water decisions
have on the entire metropolitan area-referred to as ZMVM, for the Spanish acronym of
Metropolitan Zone of the Valley of Mexico-and even at the basin level, in accordance
with IWRM.
This chapter gives an overview of the history and situation of water supply and
discharge in Mexico City. The bleak panorama that is presented highlights the need for a
sustainable water policy and the use of different strategies to solve this problem, a task
that has been hindered in the past by institutional clashes. The chapter concludes by
analyzing the institutional actors within the Valley of Mexico Basin (VMB) responsible
for this fragmentation. The physical, technological and political constraints presented in
this chapter serve as the context for exploring in the following chapters both the
political struggles around aquifer recharge and, in turn, how and why the delegaciones
of the DF have sought innovative technologies to deal with urban runoff.
2.1 A brief outline of Mexico City's water history
The Aztec capital of Tenochtitlan was established in 1325 on a small island on a system
of lakes that used to cover 1,575 km2 of the basin (Carrera-HernAindez and Gaskin,
2009). Since the VMB is a closed basin, all the water once drained to the lower plains,
creating these lakes. Thus, these lakes constituted the main water challenge for nearly
600 years, as Aztec, Spanish and Mexican governments sought to fight the constant
floods that bedeviled the capital whenever the water level rose. The pre-Columbian city
used a system of dykes that sought to control floods by separating the lakes and not
allowing an increase in the water level to overrun the city (Conagua, 2008e).
The Spanish administration came up with an alternative approach, which called
for the draining of the lakes by building tunnels and canals out of the basin. This
resolution was cemented after the catastrophic flood of 1629, which lasted for five
years (Legorreta, 2009). With this decision began a massive engineering undertaking
that continues to this very day as the canals built during the colonial period were taken
up by independent Mexico through the construction, among others, of the "Grand
Canal," inaugurated in 1900 (and still in operation), and a series of major projects built
in the 60s and 70s that drain both water and wastewater out of the valley. These
systems include the Emisior e Interceptor Poniente and the Emisor Central, with
capacities of nearly 150 m3/s. The Grand Canal has a capacity, aided by modern pumps,
of discharging 45 m3/sec. This endevour continues even today, as the federal
government is preparing a third underground water exit, begun in 2007 in the east of
the ZMVM, the Emisor Oriente (Legorreta, 2009; Perlo and Gonzalez, 2005). For all the
major works undertaken to date, flooding in the city continues. The traditional
paradigm has rarely been challenged, except by a couple of projects like the Texcoco
Lake Project in the 60s 2. Though it is true that fewer areas are affected than once were,
sporadic flooding is not unknown and episodes of meter-high floods have presented
themselves regularly in different delegaciones in the DF in the last decade.
2 This project sought to bring back the ancient Texcoco Lake by using rainwater and treated wastewater.
A first phase was completed with a 1,000 ha lake and four minor ones, but the rest of the project was
never finished.
Of course, these floods contrast starkly with the problems of water supply the
city has faced for the last sixty years. In this regard, Mexico City is not different from
other cities in the developing world, especially in Asia, which face a similar irony of
having deficient water supply and yet being regularly flooded when the rainy season
approaches (U.N.-Habitat, 2005). However, what is particularly striking in the Mexico
City case is that the floods keep happening, not only as a result of infrastructure being
unable to keep pace with sprawling urbanization, but that this has happened in spite of
the major infrastructure investment of governments for the last 400 years. The folly of
this approach became apparent when the relatively recent problems of water supply
cropped up in the middle of the twentieth century. The supply problem, related to the
exponential growth in the population of the city and thus "normal" for any developing
city, has made past decisions regarding drain and sewer infrastructure, made according
to centralized and traditional views, seem even more wrongheaded.
The supply side of water in Mexico City has followed a pattern similar to most
cities in developing and developed countries. The framework presented by Morris,
Lawrence and Foster (1997) in Chapter 1 can clearly be traced for Mexico City. The arc
presented there reflects traditional views of water management in the world up until
very recently, when IWRM began to challenge the dominant paradigm. Alas, Mexico City
has followed this process with minor differences, mainly stemming from the nature of
its aquifers.
To wit, for most of its history, Mexico City was supplied by springs in the vicinity,
namely from Chapultepec and Santa Fe, and at the beginning of the twentieth century,
Xochimilco (Sa nchez-Diaz and Gutierrez-Ojeda, 1997; Perl6 and Gonzalez, 2005;
DuBroff, 2009). The first artesian 3 well in the aquifer was made in 1847, and boreholes
were dug throughout the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries (Carrera-
Hernandez and Gaskin, 2007). The exploitation of the aquifer was soon felt in the form
of land subsidence, which was first identified in 1925. As a result, wells were closed in
the central zone of Mexico City and exploitation moved to the margins of the urban area.
With the growth of the city's population, and in hopes of avoiding further land
subsidence, the DF implemented a plan (with complete support from the federal
3 Wells in which groundwater comes out pressurized due to the confining conditions of an aquifer.
government) to bring water from wells in the neighboring Lerma Basin beginning in
1951 to complement the water being extracted from the aquifer below the city (Perl6
and Gonzalez, 2005).
Severe environmental and economic consequences in the Lerma Basin as a result
of these wells have decreased the amount of water the Lerma System provides to the
ZMVM (Tortajada and Castelan, 2003). In 1974, after a particularly severe drought and
with rising water demand, the federal government implemented the Plan de Accion
Inmediata (PAI), which built a series of wells within the VMB to complement the
provision of water to Mexico City. At the same time, plans were drawn up and
construction began on a major project, the Cutzamala system, which would bring water
from a third basin, the Cutzamala basin, for the ever-growing, ever-thirsty capital of the
country.
The Cutzamala system is a huge project, conceived in four stages, that planned to
transport 26m 3/s of water (by comparison, the DF consumes between 32 and 35 m3/s).
Though the last stage was abandoned in 2002 as a result of social pressure from
municipalities and social groups that were opposed to seeing their water resources
shipped away to Mexico City, the system still provides 15.1m 3/s to both the ZMVM and
to the city of Toluca. This water is brought from as far away as 150km and pumped up a
height of 980 meters, using in the process enough electricity to power an entire city
(Tortejada and Castelin, 2003; Conagua, 2009; Perl6 and Gonzalez, 2005). Though it
may seem the paradigm that led to the Cutzamala system's creation is a sustainable and
environmental dead end, it is far from being an exception to urban water systems in the
world, representing as it does the traditional thinking on water supply that dominated
the twentieth century. Many examples of this thinking exist in developing and
developed cities around the world. To name just a couple, Bangalore brings water from
95km away and 500 m below its elevation (U.N.-Habitat, 2005); Los Angeles has water
sources from 200 and 300 miles away (Reisner, 1993).
Only recently have changes been proposed to the water supply model for Mexico
City. A 2007 plan by the National Water Commission (Conagua by its Spanish
abbreviation) includes proposals to treat water from rivers that eventually are expelled
from the VMB and use this treated water for consumption, instead of continuing the
exploitation of several wells within the ZMVM. However, the plan is still in its initial
phases.
Contrary to Morris, Lawrence and Foster (1997), Mexico City's water
infrastructure has not abandoned the aquifer below the city, although the general
pattern described by the authors is very much evident: the closing of wells in central
locations, the Lerma and PAI systems as reaching into periurban areas of aquifers, and
finally the Cutzamala bringing in surface waters from far-away basins. Part of the
reason the aquifer hasn't been abandoned is due to its physical nature which, being
overlaid by a highly impermeable layer, protects it from pollution. This, in turn, brings
us to the important topic of the water balance existing within the area. Though the
numbers and characterization of the system for the VMB, the ZMVM, and the DF are
disputed, there exists consensus among institutions and authors that a profound
imbalance exists, much of it due to the policy and paradigms with regard to water just
described.
2.2 Water balances and some numbers
It is important to have an understanding of the current water situation to bring
into perspective why recharge wells seem to address the sustainability challenges
Mexico City faces. Looking at the situation in detail will help us understand the degree
of water strain the city faces. In doing so, we have to be reminded that this situation is
so despite, and in some cases because of, the use of traditional approaches to water
management. At the same time, it can give us an idea of the incentives city and
delegaciones have to come up with alternatives that deal with either the lack of water
supply, the discharge of rainwater or, ideally, both at the same time.
Within the VMB, the Conagua has identified seven aquifers, of which around six
can be said to be entirely or in part located beneath the ZMVM (Conagua, 2009; Brefia,
2007). Though this classification may correspond to certain realities of the groundwater
flows (Birkle et al., 1998), many hydrologists believe it is more of an artificial division
due to the integrated nature of the basin (Carrera-Hernandez and Gaskin, 2008), and
because empirical evidence may point to deep groundwater flows that are basinwide
(Carrillo-Rivera and Cardona, 2008). Thus, we have to keep in mind that the integrated
basinwide system of aquifers has an impact on Mexico City, and vice versa.
In any case, the main unit that underlies the ZMVM has a couple of characteristics
that have made it a continued source of water. The aquifer is of a semiconfined nature;
that is, the main water unit is overlaid by a thick clay strata with very low permeability.
This is known as the aquitard and has a thickness of between 30m to more than 200m
in central parts of the city (Carrillo-Rivera and Cardona, 2008; Carrera-Hernaindez and
Gaskin, 2007). Logically enough, this layer is found in what used to be the lakes of the
basin and is where 80% of the ZMVM is settled (Brefia and Brefia, 2009). Having a very
low hydraulic conductivity, or permeability4, has meant that pollution from the urban
area has not reached the aquifer, making its water still relatively safe to consume.
However, extraction still has its costs. As the water table decreases, land subsidence
appears and it becomes more costly to extract water from greater depths. Indeed, the
city is at present subsuming at a rate of 0.4 m/year and more in some places (Ortega-
Guerrero, 2008), bringing with it all manner of damage to infrastructure both above and
below ground.
According to studies, though the aquifer is currently being exploited at a greater
rate than infiltration allows it to be recharged by extracting three times more than what
is naturally recharged through infiltration (GDF, 2007), the aquifer has stored about
200 to 300 times its annual draft (Skaggs, Vail and Shankle, 2002). The aquifer is the
main source of water for the basin, the DF and the metropolitan area at large and will
continue to be so for the foreseeable future. However, the costs of reaching that water,
the uncertainty about its quality, the subsidence it causes and the unsustainable nature
in the long run of such an enterprise have made the exploitation of the aquifer a much
less attractive option, at least at the present rates of extraction and recharge.
As for exact numbers for the supply and demand of water in the basin and the
city, these vary a bit according to the institution that provides the information as well as
the year for which it is provided. In general, figures are within a +/-10% range of each
other. Though small in percentage terms, these differences add to quite a lot. For
example, two usual numbers cited for the supply of water to the DF are 32m 3/s and
4 Hydraulic conductivity has been calculated to be between 2.6x101 0 m/s in the DF to 1x10 9 m/s to 1x10-
8 m/s in the Chalco and Texcoco areas of the ZMVM. See Ortega-Guerrero, 2008 and Carrera-Hernandez
and Gaskin, 2008. Assuming a vertical movement of water through this material, it would take at least 95
years for water to travel down 30 meters.
35m 3/s. The difference of 3m3/s represents 94,608,000m 3 in a year, enough to provide
for a population of more than 1.25 million people.5 Thus, these differences are not
minor.
The tables in the Appendix seek to give a sense of the water balance and the
supply and demand for water in three distinct areas: the VMB, the ZMVM and the DF.
Information for all three is available, though hard to piece together. In the tables, figures
are given from some of the most recent official documents, namely from Conagua and
the Water System of the City of Mexico (SACM by its Spanish acronym), as well as from
authors who did extensive research on the subject (who include official sources). Not all
figures agree, in part because of different resources used, but also due to the use of
different base years (since rain and supply have natural variations throughout time) or
different mean values over different periods of time. Values are given in hectometers
cube per year, m3/second, or both. Components of rainwater, supply or wastewater may
not add up due to rounding imprecision. For certain sources, some data not explicitly
mentioned were derived using information presented within that source
As can be seen in Tables 1 through 3 of the Appendix, there is considerable
variation, but it is worth pointing out a few things in particular. It is striking that at all
levels, be it VMB, ZMVM or DF, the amount of infiltrated water into the aquifer is just
30% of what is extracted every year. Thus, independent of frame of reference, the
aquifers in the VMB are undoubtedly being depleted. Most precipitation evaporates or is
absorbed by plants. At any level we see that the total amounts of rain that either
infiltrate the ground or become runoff are less than what the region demands.6
This brings into focus the absolute dependence of the city on external sources
and on the continued overexploitation of the aquifer. Thus, looking at Table 1 of the
Appendix, the VMB extracts 1.7 times the natural mean disposability of water (that is, it
consumes 1.7 times more than what infiltration and runoff bring to the basin). By
international standards, anything over 0.4 is already considered as extreme pressure on
the water resources by the United Nations (Morales and Rodriguez, 2007). Even with
5 Assuming a consumption of 200 liters per capita per day.
6 There is no data for the runoff in the DF; however, even if we add the runoff calculated at the ZMVM to
its infiltration rate, it is still less than the DF's water supply.
this pressure on resources, the DF recognizes a deficit of 3m3/s, and for the ZMVM as a
whole a deficit of 6m 3/s exists (Perl6 and Gonzalez, 2005). The water demand is such
that additional steps have to be taken to ensure the sustainable future of water in the
ZMVM. One of the most salient features in this respect, and one which has direct bearing
on the topic of this thesis, is the amount of water expelled by the city. As seen in Table 3
of the Appendix, the amount of water discharged by the DF is even more than what it
consumes (assuming a 35% leakage rate).
This is because most runoff in the city also ends up in the sewer system. As is
noticeable in Table 2 of the Appendix, the runoff in the ZMVM is much more than the
amount of surface water and springs that are used for providing its supply. Many.of the
48 rivers that exist in the basin end up having their flow directed to the sewer network
of the city (Legorreta, 2008). Indeed, though on average only about 20% of the water
disposed through the sewer system in the region is rainwater (Appendix, Table 2), in a
particularly rainy month that proportion is reversed, and 70% of the wastewater being
disposed originates as rainwater (Conagua, 2009; see, in particular, values for the year
2007).
The VMB has a rainfall that is above dry climates, and the DF by itself has an
average rainfall of 948mm, as compared to 800mm for Nottingham, England (Conagua,
2009; Lerner 1997). That is to say, rainfall is relatively abundant. The result is usually
localized floods as the drainage system battles to pump out all the extra water which, in
the past, would have fed the lakes of the basin and which has prompted governments
throughout the years to promise more infrastructure to get the water out of the city.
Though it is true that most precipitation goes back to the atmosphere, technologies can
be pursued to increase the amount that infiltrates or even to harvest it. One such
technology is precisely recharge wells, which essentially use stormwater runoff to
recharge aquifers, thus simultaneously dealing with two of the big problems in the case
of Mexico City: water floods and aquifer depletion.
Recharge wells don't provide a panacea to the current problems of Mexico City.
The citywide program that we will explore in the next chapter calculated that 600 such
wells would increase aquifer recharge by 0.5m 3/s, when to restore the balance of the
aquifer, recharge would have to be at least 20 times that figure.
However, the relevance remains from two key sources: they begin to address the
situation and, together with other policy interventions, can help restore the
hydrological balance of the city. In addition, in studying their implementation, further
ideas on effectively implementing other sustainable solutions for the water problematic
at large can be found.
In the DF in particular, though its sources of water haven't increased in the last
fourteen years, no widespread shortage occurred until 2009, when a severe drought in
the Cutzamala region forced planned cuts throughout the city. That said, and even
though potable water coverage reaches 97.58% of the population and sewer coverage
98.59 % (Conagua, 2009), an estimated 12% of households have intermittent.service,
known as "tandeo," while the population not covered by the network has to rely on
water by truck provided by the different delegaciones (Marai6n, 2005; Pike, 2005).
Centering on the DF, which is the focus of my research, one of the key reasons for
the strain is the high leakage rate, which is equivalent to as much as 35% of all water
brought to the network; efficient water systems report losses of only 10% (GDF, 2007;
Garcia-Fresca, 2007). Solving this problem would go a long way toward restoring the
water balance in the city,7 though it would still leave open the question of how to
grapple with stormwater runoff. An ambitious metering program started in 1992 tried
to address the leakage problem, which included stepping up efforts in leak repair
(Marafi6n, 2005; Daivila and Constantino, 2007). Another key factor in the high level of
demand in the DF has been the price structure, which works against the objectives of
the metering efforts. Indeed, even by ZMVM standards, the DF has a high consumption
rate. The consumption in the DF is about 343 liters/capita/day compared to the state of
Mexico's metropolitan municipalities, which have a consumption of 229
liters/capita/day (both figures include amounts lost to leakage). A key difference
7It should be noted that most authors don't consider the high levels of leakage as replenishing the
aquifers below Mexico City. This is notable because, as Lerner (1997) explained, urbanization may
actually increase levels of infiltration overcoming the decrease of infiltration due to impermeabilized
areas in a city. This is so because of the permanent water supply underlying the city through its potable
water network, which through leaks, at times provides more water to underground resources than even
rain percolation can match. However, given that most of ZMVM is settled over low-permeability clay,
these leaks may simply end up, like in similar scenarios, in shallow aquifers or perched aquifers above the
actual body that is being exploited (Foster et. al. 1999; Raimbault, 2001).
between these figures is the tariff structure, which is much more lenient in the DF than
in other municipalities (Morales and Rodriguez, 2009).
The excessive demand and leakage problems mentioned above can be addressed
for the most part by market-oriented policies that address the demand side of the water
equation. However, water policies in Mexico City would still require integrating the
social and environmental aspects of sustainability and IWRM. Even if leakage and tariffs
brought real consumption levels to two-thirds of current demand, this would still imply
that satisfying water demands in the DF would depend on either keeping aquifer
exploitation levels above natural recharge, or the Cutzamala system. That is, even with a
perfect market-based approach, a wider IWRM approach in Mexico City would still be
needed.
The centralized supply-driven approach, following the dominant water
engineering paradigm of the twentieth century, has failed miserably. While the city
strives for more and more water, in the context of severe stress on the natural
resources of the basin (to a point where the stress is beyond all safe classification
ranges established by the United Nations) with the need to import enormous amounts
of water from other basins, Mexico City has being throwing away the resources it is
granted by nature. A combination of inertia from a past that sought to drain the lakes of
the city, coupled with the usual approach to rainwater in urban settings, has
exacerbated the already unsustainable traditional paradigm of urban water systems.
But, surely, the authorities are aware of this madness? Yes, plans have been
drawn up over time, but here is where the lack of institutional capacity and the
problems of metropolitan governance rear their head. For example, the federal
government has had on the drawing board since at least 1994 the construction of
wastewater treatment plants which would treat the entirety of wastewater from the
ZMVM. Economic crises and the democratic transition, coupled with the increase of
power by local and state actors, have prevented the project from breaking ground until
2010, and it will be on a smaller scale than the one originally planned (Murcott, Dunn
and Harleman, 1996; Robles, 2010). Even within the area, the DF uses only a third of its
established capacity for wastewater treatment, even though by law all wastewater that
is discharged into national water bodies, as is the case in the DF, must be previously
treated (Conagua, 2008b; Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 2008b).
We find, then, the paradox that when centralized governance and resources
allowed water policies to be implemented for the city (though not nearly as effectively
as authorities wished), they usually followed traditional models. As sustainability issues
began increasing in importance, so did decentralization, democratization and the
number of actors with veto power. However, what may be lost in concerted action
through decentralization, may be gained by allowing actors to try technologies and
alternatives that both satisfy immediate needs and do so according to patterns which
help understand the potential .for scaling up technologies considered a good fit for.
problems concerning the entire city. To see just how decentralization in the last decade
has interacted with the sustainability challenges in Mexico City, it is necessary to review
the institutional setting. The number of actors and multiplicity of jurisdictions will make
clear how this complexity has negatively impacted certain approaches to IWRM.
Chapter 3 will then describe this institutional dynamic for the case of water infiltration
to the aquifer and highlight the dynamic that led the DF to use certain technologies and
not others.
2.3 Institutional settings and relevant domains
The Valley of Mexico Basin (VMB) is probably the "natural" place to start, since basins
are the units that usually guide IWRM. This unit by itself contains the territories, in
whole or part, of four different states (Estado de M6xico, Hidalgo, Tlaxcala and Puebla)
and the DF (Carrera-Hernindez and Gaskin, 2007), which include more than 80 local
government units, both municipalities and delegaciones (Conagua, 2009). Within this
natural area, the different levels of government (federal, state and local) have
established organisms to deal with water issues.
The central administrative body is the National Water Commission of the federal
government, known as Conagua, which, by law, deals with water policy and creating
guidelines for the exploitation of water resources. When it is deemed to be of "public
utility," Conagua also controls the expedition of permits to exploit aquifers and surface
waters. Nationwide, Conagua has thirteen regional administrative divisions
administered by "basin bodies" (organismo de Cuenca) that can have one or more basins
within them and are Conagua's arm at the regional level (Semarnat, 2006).
In the case of the VMB, the Conagua basin body in charge is the Organismo de
Cuenca Aguas del Valle de Mexico (OCAVM), 8 which includes not only the VMB proper
but also the northern Tula basin, a receiver of much of the wastewater generated by the
VBM. In administrative terms, the OCAVM has two "subplanning" regions. One of them
corresponds roughly to the VMB, but as can be seen from Figure 4, is based on
municipalities and thus does not match the exact physical extent of the VMB per se.
8 The OCAVM is the latest incarnation of the basin-level federal authority for the VMB. This was the
Comisi6n de Aguas del Valle de Mexico (CAVM) from 1972 to 1998, the Gerencia Regional de Aguas del
Valle de M6xico (Gravamex) from 1998 to 2003, and the Gerencia Regional del Aguas del Valle de M6xico
y Sistema Cutzamala (Gravamexsc) from 2003 until 2006 (Conagua, 2009).
Figure 4. Map of overlapping bodies within the Valley of Mexico Basin
z
iI~I
DD~
F
I
'C
i
a
j
I
I
iiU
C4J
U*
0
0
MIN
0
Z*
..........
The physical extent of the VMB (not shown in Figure 4) includes parts of Puebla in the
northeast, and doesn't encompass as much area to the south as it seems from the
OCAVM's division. The area differences are not that big, but even at this aggregate level
we begin to see some of the problems in administering a physical reality such as the
basin, which also has to compete with political realities.
The 1992 National Waters Law established basin councils, which were meant to
bring together users at the basin level, although their role was purely consultative and
Conagua nominated the members. Subsequently, the 2004 national water law tried to
overhaul this centralizing vision, giving a greater role to basin councils which bring
together users, local and state governments, and other stakeholders, with many
decisions having to be made in concert with the basin bodies, thus still preserving a
relatively strong position for the federal government. That said, many basin councils
have yet to be established, and their role is far from cemented.
The Basin Council for the Valley of Mexico was the first one of its kind
established in Mexico, and brings together stakeholders both from the VMB and the
Tula Basin to the north (Gonzalez-Reynoso, 2004). Though it would be a prime
candidate for the coordination needed to provide a comprehensive water policy
basinwide, the council has had a less than stellar performance. After being established
in 1995, it didn't have another plenary meeting until October of 2008. Still,
subcomissions dealing with irrigation or groundwater have worked under its banner,
though composed according to the 1992 law. In recent years, greater coordination has
occured and some organizations at a subbasin level have been established, but the
council is still far from the central player it could be (Gonzilez-Reynoso, 2004; Burns,
2009).
Without much in the sense of coordination, together with the OCAVM, the DF and
surrounding metropolitan municipalities take a central role in water policy, especially
as it affects citizens' daily lives. According to the Constitution, the municipalities are in
charge of the provision of potable water and sanitation services to the population.
Though in general municipalities have a great deal of autonomy in deciding these
policies, dealing with Mexico City's core, the DF, is different. Though the equivalent local
level to the municipalities in the DF is the delegacion, the powers invested in these
authorities are less substantial. For example, delegaciones can't charge any taxes, and
the DF government allocates their entire budget. With regard to water, it is the DF,
through the Water System of Mexico City (SACM by its Spanish acronym), which is in
charge of water supply and providing sewer services per se for the city through the
primary network, although the delegacion is in charge of the upkeep of the secondary
network which actually reaches people's households.
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This centralistic form of government is normal given the role of the DF as the
capital city, and this within a highly centralized government until recently (1997) in
which the President of the country chose the mayor (Davis, 2002). The importance of
the capital city in the Mexican context and its past history as an appendage of federal
power can be readily seen today in the realm of water, for example, where the SACM
operates 52 wells outside of its political boundaries in the neighboring State of Mexico
(Perl6 and Gonzalez, 2005). Though it would seem the DF offers a key metropolitan
governance structure such as those discussed in the first chapter, the growth of the city
to the municipalities in neighboring states has complicated the panorama. This growth
has been accompanied by the democratization and decentralization trends common to
Latin America throughout the end of the twentieth century and which, to some
observers, have constituted obstacles to the emergence of metropolitan areas as
political entities (Lefevre, 2008).
In the case of Mexico City, even though the metropolitan area spilled over to
State of Mexico municipalities in the second half of the twentieth century, until now
there has been little in the way of effective metropolitan governance structures.
However, ZMVM constitutes a key "entity" that overlays the physical and administrative
realities of the basin and the water entities governing it.
Metropolitan actions in Mexico City usually take the form of voluntary
commissions that bring together the state governments and municipalities within the
metropolitan area. In this sense, the structure is reminiscent of the "polycentric model"
and the usual accompanying multilateral cooperative bodies highlighted by some of the
literature (Ostrom, Schroeder and Wynee, 1961; Feiock, 2004). However their
effectiveness is quite limited.
The first of these institutions to be established was the Conurbation Commission
in 1976 (de Alba, 2006). Since then, different bodies have been established in a
piecemeal fashion dealing with single topics such as transportation or pollution or, in
1994, water and sanitation. The most formal institutionalization, however, came in
1998 when an Executive Commission for Metropolitan Coordination (Comisi6n
Ejecutiva de Coordinaci6n Metropolitana) was established through a bilateral accord
between the DF and the State of Mexico, bringing under its wing the other metropolitan
commissions. The commission deals with the problems within the ZMVM. In 2005, a
Metropolitan Fund was established with the participation of the federal government
and both State of Mexico and DF governments, with the resources being used for several
projects including the upkeep of dams, drainage system locks and other water
infrastructure (de Alba, 2006; Estado de Mexico and DF, 1998). This fund is
complemented by the Fideicomiso 1928 (Trust 1928), originally established to
administer an international loan to build a set of water treatment plants in 1997.
The ZMVM definition and area has varied over time as the city has expanded. For
counting purposes, the INEGI (the Mexican equivalent of the U.S. Census Bureau)
defined the city in 1990 as the Metropolitan Zone of Mexico City (ZMCM), encompassing
all 16 delegaciones of the DF as well as thirty-five municipalities of the State of Mexico.
In 2004 a new ZMVM was defined with additional municipalities being included,
bringing the number to sixteen delegaciones, fifty-nine municipalities from the State of
Mexico and one municipality from the state of Hidalgo. This division coincided roughly
with the area the Metropolitan Commission worked on (minus the one municipality of
the state of Hidalgo). In 2008 the Metropolitan Commission formally invited Hidalgo to
join and included 29 municipalities from that state. This change has not been reflected
in the definition given by the INEGI on what constitutes the ZMVM (INEGI, 2009). Notice
that this does not mean the entire ZMVM is urbanized (see Figure 3); many of the
municipalities have an important natural and even agricultural component in their
midst. This is especially relevant when talking about technologies to enhance aquifer
recharge, as mentioned in the literature review above.
It is also worth noting that judging just by the municipalities with the INEGI
definition, the metropolitan area spills over to other basins. As can be seen in Figure 1,
there are ZMVM municipalities outside the OCAVM subadministrative division. The
ZMVM municipalities to the north not within the blue outline correspond to
governments in the Tula basin. Those municipalities in the south of the ZMVM not in the
OCAVM subadministrative division are actually in the Balsas basin. Some authors even
suggest having as a unit of analysis not the VMB but a region encompassing four basins,
given the history of water infrastructure uniting these, in what they call the
"hydropolitan" region (Perl6 and Gonzalez, 2005). This research, however, will center
on the VMB unit for greater consistency.
One of the best examples of how institutional fragmentation complicates water
policy can be judged by the overlapping nature of the jurisdictions of the hydraulic
infrastructure described in the first part of this chapter. With regard to the aquifers
below the city, in 1954 the federal government decreed an indefinite ban on the
exploitation of the aquifers underlying the city (SCJN, 2007). The provision continues to
this day and has officially given control of the aquifer to Conagua, which can authorize
the drilling of new wells and establish the amount of water to be exploited by
governments or individuals, even though the Constitution says groundwater can be
freely exploited. That said, there is no regulation of the decree, which some authors see
as a problem for effective implementation of the ban (Burns, 2009). The wells
authorized by the OCAVM for exploiting the aquifers below the VMB reached 4,003 in
2008, managed both by governments and individuals. This figure doesn't include
possible illegal wells, though they are thought to exist. Of the official number, 1,229
exist in the DF, with more than 1,000 being for urban public use. Wells in the DF are
either operated by SACM or fall under its purview. It must be noted that not all wells are
necessarily in use (Conagua, 2009; Perl6 and Gonzalez, 2005). Nearly 3,537 wells were
present in the ZMVM in 1990 (Carrera-Hernandez and Gaskin, 2007).
The Lerma and PAI systems continue operating, though their supply has been
continually declining. The Lerma system, at present, is managed by the DF, even though
its wells are located in the State of Mexico, and a sizable portion of the water is given to
the State of Mexico as part of various agreements. The PAI system has wells and a dam
operated by Conagua through its arm, the OCAVM, along with eighty-four wells
managed by the DF, seventy by the state of Mexico and eighteen by Hidalgo (Conagua,
2009).
Finally, there is the giant Cutzamala system, operated by Conagua. Two
aqueducts that complement the Cutzamala system are being built by the State of Mexico
and the DF, respectively. The State of Mexico's Macrocircuito forms an arch around the
municipalities that surround the northern part of the DF, while the DF has built the
Acuaferico, which runs through the south of the DF's delegaciones. The Acuaferico
project in particular could truly represent what the OECD terms the diseconomies of
scale of centralized systems (OECD, 2009) in as much as the present amount of water
the DF receives from the Cutzamala is set to be reduced as the State of Mexico finishes
different stages of the Macrocircuito, bringing down the value that the Acuaferico
provides to the DF in terms of helping satisfy demand.
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Given the amount of actors on the stage and the multiplicity of settings (Figure 6
presents an approximate picture of the overlap of actors, the water structures and
basins that are in play), it is not surprising some researchers find in this institutional
fragmentation a key to the woes of water management in Mexico City (Tortajada, 2008).
Admittedly, since an important part of the water supply in Mexico City comes from the
aquifers underlying the city, and this depends on the DF on the one hand and the
various municipalities in the metropolitan area on the other, we would find a prime
setting for the "race to the bottom" feared by some of decentralization's critics.
From a purely theoretical standpoint, extracting water from a common aquifer
may result in a classic prisoner's dilemma situation: everybody may be better off by
exploiting the aquifer in a rational way, but this offers the chance for some to increase
their share at the expense of others, especially since the aquifer's levels are not directly
visible.9 The constitutional provision in Mexico that allows for aquifers to be freely
exploited would certainly entail this scenario. As discussed above, the 1954 decree was
designed to deal with this potential problem. Still, the aquifers below the city keep
suffering from severe drawdown, which can be explained by the OCAVM's monitoring
capabilities, which are severely limited, and because of the continued demand for water
for the city and the failure of supply-oriented strategies to deal with the problem.
Indeed, the registered and authorized extraction rate in the DF is 25m 2/s (Conagua,
9 For a game theory analysis of metropolitan governance, see Steinacker, 2004.
2009), even though it is known this rate is depleting the aquifers. The present
fragmentation of authorities certainly does not help the situation.
It is worth noting that theory regarding metropolitan governance and
polycentric models underscores the fact that cooperation will not occur unless benefits
are greater than costs (Feiock, 2004). If this is the case, metropolitan governance would
be characterized by a series of jump-start policies in which a problem has to reach
critical proportions before anything is done with regard to it. Indeed, informal
cooperation would usually be the first response since it is less "costly" economically and
politically.
This would seem to be the case of Mexico City with regard to water policy in the
last 20 years. The history of Fideicomiso 1928, mentioned above, is just one example
among many of the difficulties of collaboration which have bedeviled water policy in
Mexico City and the "stop and go" nature of many programs and initiatives. The
democratic election of the DF government in 1997 and this new government's
opposition to the water treatment plants, for which the international loan and trust was
established, resulted in the cancellation of the water treatment plants project and of the
federal government paying a hefty penalty. Eventually, the trust was reactivated in 2005
with payments by the water systems in the ZMVM. It has since used the money for the
Emisor Oriente project and the building of water treatment plants, though not at the
level originally envisioned (Legorreta, 2006; Burns, 2009). In a similar manner, a 1992
program begun by the DF established the ambitious goal of mapping the network,
metering consumption and eventually privatizing the water service in the city. This
program was conceived in four stages. However, though the metering and charging of
water was accomplished, the privatization of the actual supply (the fourth stage) never
happened. Again, the newly elected mayor in 1997 decided to ditch the fourth stage of
the program and renegotiated with the four water companies, who still operate today in
billing for water services (Pike, 2005; Marafn6n, 2004b).
To be clear, differently from a fully polycentric model, which assumes equivalent
horizontal authorities within a metropolis, this governance dynamic has been carried
out mostly between the DF and the federal government. As such, it was more a matter of
a recently decentralized and democratized government asserting its independence.
However, the reality was that this governance pattern increased, at least in the
beginning, the costs to begin "institutional collective action." The fact that for the past
ten years the DF and the federal government have been in hands of opposing political
parties (the DF with the center-left PRD and the federal government with the right of
center PAN) has only made things more complicated.
In the next chapter, we will present this governance dynamic specifically as it
relates to aquifer recharge. Decentralization without cooperation structures resulted in
stop-and-go measures between the DF and Conagua that ranged from formal
confrontation to informal cooperation. Thus, measures espousing environmentally
sustainable ideas, including on the topic of water, have suffered from a lack of formal
cooperation between different levels of government. At the same. time, the
decentralization didn't stop there. As we will see in Chapter 4, at the level of the
delegaciones, decentralization also engendered a series of sustainability measures
(recharge wells among them) that involved informal cooperation from all three levels of
government in some cases (specifically, profiting from technology developed by the city
government). In general, the local approaches would follow a pattern that was more
closely tailored to a particular delegacion's problems, allowing them to complement the
efforts that had reached an impasse at the federal and state levels.
Chapter 3. Metropolitan governance and recharging the aquifer: Stunted
growth at the state level
As we saw in the last chapter, Mexico City's water situation is such that a wholesale
rethinking of sustainable water policies is necessary to begin to address its many
hydrological imbalances, which result from a history of following the traditional water
management paradigm. At the same time, decentralization and democratization in the
DF over the past 13 years created a fragmented institutional environment which made
it difficult for different levels of government to coordinate themselves in order to face
these water challenges productively.
This chapter will discuss the governance dynamic between national and DF
governments with regard to aquifer recharge. This narrative allows us to clearly see a
case where decentralization and sustainability worked against each other. At the same
time, the particular case of the recharge wells illustrates how piecemeal approaches
allowed by decentralization may lead to more informal types of cooperation. This, in
turn, sets the stage to understand part of the reason for the existence of recharge wells
at the delegacion level (which will be dealt with in chapter 4), since a major effort from
the city government allowed the recharge well's design to "percolate" and eventually be
used by some of the delegaciones.
3.1 Formal Clashes: DF v. Conagua
Mindful of the water problems in the capital, at the beginning of the century the
DF government, led by the L6pez Obrador administration (2000-2006), commissioned
major studies involving local universities and foreign researchers in an attempt to come
up with a comprehensive long-term solution to the aquifer depletion in the city. The
plan recommended as its centerpiece the treatment and injection of the city's
wastewater into the aquifer; it also called for increasing the natural recharge through
technologies such as the one we will explore in the following chapters (Skaggs, Vail and
Shankle, 2002). The injection of treated wastewater occurs in the region in at least two
places: the Sierra of Santa Catarina in the east of the DF, under DF authority, which
recharges treated water at 17 liters/second (GDF, 2007), and the project in a federal
area just past the border of the DF, where a plant treats water and injects it at a rate of
50 liters/second (Alcintara, 2002; OCAVM, personal interview, 2009). The DF decided
to go along with the project for injection, preparing sitting studies and a pilot program
that would inject up to 2m3/s into the aquifer (GDF, 2007).
In January of 2004, the DF administration unveiled a plan that included the
construction of 600 recharge wells for aquifer recharge with rainwater, as well as a
water treatment plant that would inject treated water to the aquifer. Absent federal
regulations on wastewater treatment for injection, the DF issued a regulation for this on
March 2004 after nearly two years of consultation, norm NADF-003-AGUA-2002.
However, the federal government intervened on May of that year by lodging a complaint
against the DF at the Supreme Court, arguing that the DF needed to wait for federal
regulation and had overstepped its bounds. Among the arguments presented, the 1954
ban on aquifer exploitation was invoked as well as several other federal laws, which the
national government argued made clear that the creation of those types of norms was
under their jurisdiction (SCJN, 2007). Stuck in court, the project of widespread injection
of treated wastewater into the aquifer was stopped.
The court issued a ruling on November of 2005 (more than a year later), which
decided in favor of the Federation, with two dissenting votes from the total of 11
justices (SCJN, 2007). As a consequence, the ZMVM was left with a paradoxical scenario,
unable to inject treated water to the aquifer for lack of federal regulation, yet having
two wells that did just that, one in the hands of the DF and the other in the hands of the
OCAVM.
As a result of this challenge, the DF was left with only some of the
complementary actions studied, which included enhancing natural recharge of the
aquifer (Skaggs, Vail and Shankle, 2002). The "Program for the Recharge of the Aquifer
in the South of Mexico City," which contemplated the 600 recharge wells that would
take advantage of the natural porous media in the southwest of the city-which
receives most of the rain in the area and is a main path for aquifer recharge-was kept
alive (GDF, 2004a). This was done even though federal regulation to infiltrate rainwater
and runoff was similarly lacking.
As this research was being done, in August of 2009, the federal government
finally published two regulations: the NOM-014-CONAGUA-2003 for requisites for
artificial recharge of water with treated wastewater, and the NOM-015-CONAGUA-2007
for artificial infiltration of water to aquifers. This last one specifically deals with
rainwater and stormwater runoff directed to the subsurface. When asked in an
interview what the Conagua did with the obvious cases of recharge wells being built
between 2000 and 2009 in the DF, a civil servant in the Conagua gave a revealing
answer: the Conagua tried to give follow-up to these structures, there were "non-
written norms" for dealing with these cases.
3.2 Informal cooperation: Recharge wells in the DF government
As the challenge to treat wastewater injection was unfolding, in parallel Conagua
and the DF seemed to be cooperating on the creation of recharge wells. According to
news accounts of a press conference by the city's minister of the environment in June
2004, the DF was working in conjunction with Conagua for the creation of the recharge
wells, with a first phase of sixty planned to evaluate their performance (Ramirez, 2004).
This account is consistent with my interviews of personnel from SACM. According to the
SACM, the Conagua asked for a presentation on the technology being used, which was
done, and SACM also sent their projects Conagua's way, which they acknowledged
(SACM, personal interview, 2009). This is a very clear illustration of what the Conagua
civil servant meant by "non-written rules" as guiding interactions on this topic. Though
it isn't clear whether the scaling back of the program (of the 600 envisioned and
planned only sixty were to be built as a "first phase") was due to these interactions, the
fact remains that cooperation between these levels of government happened
simultaneously with the formal claim going on in court regarding the norms published.
It certainly is striking that whereas the treated water project never got off the
ground due to federal opposition, the recharge wells, which are also intervening in the
water balance of the aquifer, faced no opposition. This could be due to the fact that the
DF chose not to enact a formal guideline on runoff recharge in contrast to the treated
water one. For its part, some news gave a political dimension to the decision, since at
that moment there was a major confrontation between the mayor of Mexico City
(pertaining to the left-of-center PRD) and President Fox (from the right-of-center PAN;
(Aviles, 2004). However, Conagua's cooperation on the recharge wells may hint at the
different dynamics of a formal versus informal setting. Conagua could be argued to have
been acting from fear of potential pollution of the aquifer, thus explaining both the
judicial actions for a formal government act and cooperating with the DF in the creation
of a technology without formal standing, except that the water law of the DF required
infiltration projects be undertaken in conjunction with Conagua (GDF, 2003b).
That said, the recharge well program was also much less controversial, not only
from a juridical point of view but also technically, both because of the type of water to
be infiltrated and the amount that could be achieved. Given that highly impermeable
strata overlay a good deal of the DF, the city government's original focus on injecting
treated water to the aquifer made sense. With this path closed by the federal
government's intervention, the DF centered on its much more piecemeal measures
focusing on rainwater. Specifically, this translated into the recharge wells program and
a greater emphasis on the conservation of green areas where natural recharge occurs.
According its Urban Development General Program of 1996, the DF is divided
into urban area and conservation ground (suelo de conservacidn; Figure 7).
Development is allowed in the conservation ground but is subject to much stricter
guidelines; for example, in conservation grounds the building code of the DF establishes
the need for presenting rainwater harvesting projects as a prerequisite for acquiring the
permit to build (GDF, 2004b). Within the conservation ground there exist natural
protected areas (ANP) which are proper ecological reserves. It is this last type of land
use which city administrations have been intent on increasing.
Figure 7. Conservation ground with different controlled uses
Source: Reproduced from GDF, 2000b.
In 2000, 9.3% of the conservation ground was considered ANP; the 2007
Program on Sustainable Management of Water in the DF establishes the goal of
declaring 39% of the conservation ground as ANP (GDF, 2000b; GDF, 2007). The actual
success of these zoning measures is hard to assess as illegal settlements spring up all
the time in these areas and are eventually absorbed into the city (Pezzoli, 2002;
DuBroff, 2009).
As mentioned, according to the water law of the DF of 2003, only the SACM, in
conjunction with the Conagua, is allowed the right to undertake water infiltration
projects, though the law specifies this only in environmental conservation areas. It is
not clear if this would include the entire conservation ground or only the ANP areas. In
any case, the actual recharge wells were projected mostly in the conservation ground
areas. It must be noted that in interviews, members of the SACM said that infiltration
was only one of the criteria for siting the recharge wells; another was flooding
problems. This was confirmed by interviews with different delegacion personnel that
said the SACM approached them before building a well to ask where they had localized
flooding problems of importance. Thus, the recharge wells, at least by SACM standards,
were used with the dual purpose described in the literature of dealing both with runoff
and helping recharge the aquifer. This is important to know since in written documents,
recharge wells are presented as aiding the recharge of the aquifer and flooding
considerations are mentioned in passing (see, specifically, the Program for Sustainable
Management of Water in Mexico City, December 2007). As we shall see, for the
delegaciones flooding considerations are their primary concern.
What is important to notice is that even after the rebuke of the treated water
project, the DF kept intact other parts of its water strategy, though the actual carrying
out of actions has been somewhat delayed, needing to be retaken by different
administrations. The case of the recharge wells exemplifies this very well. Though siting
studies were made for 600, the Lopez Obrador administration (2000-2006) only
carried out sixty-two as a "first-stage" plan, even though the original plan was for the
600 to be completed in three years (Bolaios-SAnchez, 2004b). The Ebrard
administration (2006-2012) has promised 500 wells in its water management
program. These are the same wells studied by the last administration (SACM, personal
interview, 2009), and up to 2008 only two had been built, bringing the number to a total
of sixty-four (SACM, request for public information, 2009; see Table 2).
Table 2. Recharge wells built according to the delegacion
Recharge
Recharge wells wells built by Total
Delegacion built by city
delegaciones government
TLAHUAC 15 2 17
IZTAPALAPA 170 0 170
XOCHIMILCO 15 4 19
TLALPAN 0 55 55
COYOACAN 2 7* 9
IZTACALCO 233 0 233
AZCAPOTZALCO 0 0 0
VENUSTIANO CARRANZA 0 0 0
MILPA ALTA 1 3 4
GUSTAVO A. MADERO 0 0 0
ALVARO OBREGON 0 0 0
MAGDALENA CONTRERAS 0 0 0
BENITO JUAREZ 0 0 0
CUAUHTEMOC 0 0 0
MIGUEL HIDALGO 0 0 0
CUAJIMALPA 0 0 0
Source: Compiled by author with requests for public information. *Coyoacan reports seven
recharge wells built by the DF, though information from SACM doesn't reflect this.
The wells have a very specific design established by the SACM (Figures 8 and 9).
The depth of each well, which has perforations, is generally of 10 to 20 meters, though a
SACM interviewee recounted that in the application of the program it was found that
deeper perforations allowed for a better flow of water; indeed, some delegaciones have
mentioned they have wells as deep as 60 meters. The well is preceded by a structure
whose aim is to slow the flow of water and act as a trap for solids, oils and greases that
may be carried along with the runoff. As we've seen, this is a main worry of hydrologists
studying infiltration devices, especially those that filter water without the benefit of it
percolating through topsoil (Ellis, 1997; Watkins, 1997). A mean capacity of 100 liters
per second was sought; unfortunately, there are no reliable measures of the capacity of
these wells or whether the water table in the vicinity has changed. The decision was
taken early on to monitor only one of the wells after the occurrence of vandalism on the
measuring devices of the first fourteen wells built, so the real effect of the wells is
unknown (SACM, personal interview, 2009).
Figure 8. Cross-section of recharge well
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Figure 9. Recharge well building process and water capture grid
Source: SACM,PowerPoint presentation, undated.
Apart from technological reasons, these specifications are important since they
signal a break from past projects and are a key in seeing what the delegaciones did.
According to interviews, since at least the 1960s infiltration devices have been built in
the south of the city in the area known as Pedregales. This area's geology is made up of
volcanic rock, making the introduction of drainage prohibitively expensive. As a result,
there have been infiltration devices built in the area, sometimes by neighbors
themselves and many times consisting of simply directing the water to a crack in the
rock with high permeability. Thus, between the 1960s and 1999 an interviewee
estimates there were about 300 of such structures built, although their types are not
differentiated (SACM, personal interview, 2009).10
Thus, a pretty straightforward story can be traced for the fate of the recharge
wells in the DF's overall water strategy: the recharge wells were planned as a
complement to a comprehensive strategy; that strategy was challenged by the federal
government; and it then continued with more modest aspects (namely the recharge
wells) through informal cooperation with Conagua. Thus, innovations and policy
10 This does not account for the existence of five wells during the 60s which directed water from the
Magdalena River in the DF to the ground and which were eventually abandoned due to lack of
maintenance (GDF, 2007).
choices in water management and technology by the DF are shaped, and even propelled,
by all the constraints not only of their physical environment, but also by politics and the
demands of various actors, institutional and otherwise, in a setting that makes
metropolitan governance in water quite challenging. This has resulted in increased
informal cooperation between the different actors being the norm, with different
motivations guiding each one. In our case specifically, these differing motiviations
meant cooperation was possible with much less controversial water technologies (both
because of the type of water that was to be infiltrated and the amount that could be
achieved). As such, the results are mixed, curtailing certain innovations but allowing
new alternatives to be attempted, as a result of decentralization, in response to this
curtailment.
In a way, the same type of relations not codified by law but present nonetheless
is evident in the case of the delegaciones building recharge wells. Even though only the
DF is mentioned as being in charge of these types of structures in the law, some
delegaciones have taken an active approach and built these structures themselves. In
this sense, it is remarkable the amount of variation existing between delegaciones when
it comes to the number of recharge wells they build. What incentives and factors were
necessary to mobilize delegaciones to undertake the building of these units is key in
understanding how "sustainability" may be achieved, especially since we've seen that
decentralization, at least when coupled with political factors, may lead to less than
desirable outcomes. If metropolitan governance hopes to achieve any type of
sustainability with regard to water issues, it is necessary to understand how these
actors operate. What their incentive structure is and how they relate to the wider
metropolitan area are both critical. These may well be "agents of urban livability"
(Evans, 2002), and it is key to understand how increased decentralization and
democratization over the course of the 90s affected local sustainable water issues in
Mexico City, especially in view of the difficulties at the national and state level. We turn
to how these local units handled a technology that the DF developed in the next chapter.
Chapter 4: Realities of implementation at the local level
In this chapter we will explore the situation and reasons for the delegaciones
building infiltration devices and the lessons this provides for water management in
Mexico City. First, I will give an explanation on the multiple meanings of the term
"recharge well" used by authorities, which will aid us in understanding the dynamics at
work in the implementation of solutions and experimentation with novel ways to
manage water. Afterwards, we will proceed to a presentation of key variables from a
systemic perspective, which may provide explanations for the adoption patterns. The
chapter will end with a discussion that brings together the lessons from the case
studies. As will be argued, the pattern of adoption points to very local concerns on the
part of the delegaciones, making the prospect of integral water management in the
region difficult, though not impossible. If the reasons for adoption of recharge wells by
the delegaciones are analyzed, the results suggest a management model of innovation
by the central city government and adoption by local governments.
It is at the delegacion level that the citizens have their closest contact with
government and where the implementation of innovations is often found. Even though
delegaciones have been popularly elected since 2000, there exists within the DF a rather
centralized structure, and the delegaciones powers are limited. As explained in Chapter
2, in contrast to municipalities, delegaciones are not responsible for water supply and
drainage in the same way since the DF has a direct responsibility both for supplying
bulk water and charging for it, as well as connecting the delegacion to the primary
sewer network. At the end, however, it is the delegaciones who are the closest elected
authorities the people have, and as result they are held responsible for bringing water
to neighborhoods (Pike, 2005) and dealing with the day-to-day problems of the citizens.
Research was undertaken in ten delegaciones as well as the DF, OCAVM and
Conagua, conducting semistructured interviews with people responsible for water
management in administrations since at least 2000, where possible. The heads of the
delegacion were democratically elected for the first time in 2000 and only three
democratically elected administrations have been in power, encompassing the years
2000-2003; 2003-2006; and 2006-2009. The choice of delegaciones was based on
preliminary research from public information requests to all sixteen delegaciones on
recharge wells built either by the delegacion or by the city government in their area. All
delegaciones with recharge wells were selected for interviews with people in charge of
the water policy in those entities, as well as three with no such infrastructures to be
included as control. This choice also has the advantage of including delegaciones with
different characteristics which seemed pertinent, in particular highly urbanized and not
so highly urbanized delegaciones (Figure 10). The formal request for public information
on which the choice for delegaciones was based is presented in Table 3.
Figure 10. Map highlighting delegaciones chosen
DF Delegaciones
Legend
ource: Author with informabin from MIT GeoData Bast
One of the most puzzling aspects of the creation of infiltration infrastructure is a
relationship that is suggested between the lack of water in the delegacion and the
existence of recharge wells. If we look at our original data, we will see that most of the
delegaciones with a high level of water availability per capita per day are the ones that
don't have these type of structures.
Table 3. Comparison of delegaciones' water availability and originally
reported recharge wells figure
Recharge
Delegacion l/c/d wells
originally
reported
CUAJIMALPA 507.07 0
CUAUHTEMOC 483.91 0
MIGUEL HIDALGO 480.22 0
BENITO JUAREZ 454.61 0
MAGDALENA CONTRERAS 417.79 0
ALVARO OBREGON 386.04 0
GUSTAVO A. MADERO 341.06 0
VENUSTIANO CARRANZA 339.64 0
AZCAPOTZALCO 327.48 0
IZTACALCO 317.8 233
COYOACAN 314.06 9
TLALPAN 250.86 55
IZTAPALAPA 239.38 170
MILPA ALTA 228.12 4
XOCHIMILCO 215.96 19
TLAHUAC 178.77 17
Source: Compiled by author with information from Davila and
Constantino, 2007; INEGI, 2005; and requests for public information.
Figures are for 2004 disposable water over population of 2005.
It is evident that the bulk of projects are happening in water-deprived
delegaciones. Even if we only look at the delegaciones that were researched and for
which information was corrected (see the following section), the pattern seems to hold
(Table 4).
Table 4. Water availability by delegacion studied and the
number of infiltration structures identified
Total
infiltration
Delegacion l/d/c structures
built in the
delegacion
MIGUEL HIDALGO 480.23 0
ALVARO OBREGON 386.04 0
GUSTAVO A. MADERO 341.06 0
IZTACALCO 317.8 233
COYOACAN 314.06 95
TLALPAN 250.86 155
IZTAPALAPA 239.38 170
MILPA ALTA 228.12 4
XOCHIMILCO 215.97 171
TLAHUAC 178.77 46
Source: Compiled by author with information from Davila and
Constantino, 2007; INEGI, 2005; Burns, 2009; and requests for
public information. Figures are for 2004 disposable water
over population of 2005.
Unfortunately, the limited number of observations keeps us from performing
more sophisticated statistical analysis; however, they serve to inform our research. In
particular, they force us to ask a puzzling question: why do delegaciones take up these
projects? Perhaps, it would seem, because they are helping to keep the aquifer
recharged and thus providing for the needs of the entity. However, given the legal
structure of water provision in the DF and the long-term and common-good nature of
the aquifer, this doesn't seem to be the incentive at play.
As the case studies will make clear, this was not the primary reason behind the
construction of infiltration structures. Indeed, lack of water is an indicator not only of
water-poor delegaciones, but of infrastructure-poor delegaciones as well. As we will
see, the choice to build infiltration technologies involved deficient stormwater systems
in the delegaciones which resulted in widespread negative physical effects or negative
effects on citizens that spurred delegaciones into action. This overall reason was
coupled with other key worries that dictated the adoption or not of infiltration
technologies. Other factors included cost concerns (dictating which type of technology
they were more inclined to use) and physical and political realities (space, level of
urbanization, geology, citizen demands). Thus, local concerns eclipse the larger water
problematic of the metropolis. The key is to find ways of formalizing organizational
incentives that profit from geophysical and institutional realities.
In any case, decentralization of some functions at the delegacion level allowed
for different authorities to respond to water problems as they best saw fit. In-depth
research within these delegaciones revealed that "infiltration wells" served, many times,
as a catch-all term that implied different infiltration technologies. This is quite
important because different technologies have different costs and benefits. Though it
complicates our analysis, the wide variety of solutions proposed by the delegaciones
can be seen as confirming the benefits of decentralization, at least in the ability to come
up with new alternatives without having to wait for the central government. However,
the fact that many of these solutions had narrow cost-benefit considerations reveals
that scaling up in a fragmented institutional environment remains the key challenge for
metropolitan governance in Mexico City.
4.1 Semantics: Infrastructure built under the name of recharge well
Research in the field revealed that the term recharge well (pozo de absorcidn) is
used to denote a variety of structures in the different delegaciones. Depending on the
delegacion, a recharge well may be what we just described as the formal SACM
technology and is named as such in the literature or, alternatively, vadose injection well
(U.N.-Habitat, 2005; Howard et al., 2007; UNEP, 2007; Kresic, 2009). However, some
delegaciones also included in the information sent what could be more aptly described
either as infiltration basins or infiltration trenches. There was also the inclusion of
infrastructure built just to divert water into cracks in the soil (referred to as
resumideros). Conversely, some delegaciones used the term in its literal sense but
research showed that they had also built other infiltration structures. Since this
information was captured as a result of interviews, we only have relatively reliable
information for the ten delegaciones included in the study, and even then, exact
numbers were hard to come by. However, a breakdown of the type of technologies used
is attempted in Table 5, since it may become a key variable as each technology has a
different cost attached to it and, in conjunction with this, a number of reasons why it
was chosen.
Table 5. Infiltration technology type and number in selected delegaciones
Infiltration
Delegacion Recharge wells Infiltration trenches or Non-basins similar or specified
resumideros
TLAHUAC (2 -DF) 4 40~45 0
IZTAPALAPA 141 13 8 8
XOCHIMILCO 15 / (4-DF) 0 152 0
TLALPAN (55-DF) 1 ~100 0
COYOACAN 2/(0-DF)* 0 86 (7-DF)* 0
IZTACALCO 0 0 233 0
MILPA ALTA 1 / (3-DF) 0 0 0
GUSTAVO A MADERO 0 0 0 0
ALVARO OBREGON 0 0 0 o
MIGUEL HIDALGO 0 0 0 o
* Reported by the delegacion as seven recharge wells built by the DF, but no record of them was found
in the information provided by SACM. It is assumed they represent some other type of structure. In
parentheses are recharge wells built by the central city government. Source: Compiled by author.
This new classification gives a better idea of the state of infiltration
infrastructure built in these ten delegaciones from around 2000 to 2008, although the
interviewees made clear a couple of the infrastructures had been there since before
2000. Among these older infrastructures we can mention a recharge well built in Milpa
Alta in 1998, for which no explanation was given of the circumstances under which it
was built; some of the infiltration trenches in Xochimilco, which began building them in
1998; and the infiltration basins in Tlahuac that were part of the projects made in
connection to the citywide water treatment and infiltration projects in the Sierra de
Santa Catarina in the 90s.
As for classification issues, three different types of infrastructure were noted:
recharge wells, infiltration trenches and resumideros, and recharge basins. Recharge
well is the name given to the wells like the ones described in Chapter 3 and developed
by the SACM. A key finding on the nature of the expansion of this innovation is that the
delegaciones used SACM blueprints for their recharge wells (SACM, personal interview,
2009; Coyoacan, personal interview, 2009; Xochimilco, personal interview, 2009;
Iztapalapa, personal interview, 2009). With regard to the infiltration basins, these are
zones established in order for water to infiltrate through an extensive, permeable area
(Figure 11). In contrast to the practice in many developed countries, the runoff that is
channeled here is not subject to preliminary filtration through settling ponds or other
methods (UNEP, 2004; Kresic, 2009; Dillon, Toze and Pavelic, 2007), which may raise
concerns on the effectiveness of this approach and its overall impact on the aquifer.
Figure 11. Recharge basin in Iztapalapa
Source: Delegacion Iztapalapa (2009a), Pozos de absorcion,
PowerPoint presentation, June 4, 2009.
Finally, infiltration trenches or other subsurface devices constitute a third type of
structure. The common denominator of these devices is that they involve some type of
underground structure, usually between 3 and 6 meters deep, designed to infiltrate
storm water. However, other than that, these structures vary a lot, from excavations
filled with filtering material to simple underground channels that convey urban runoff
to permeable cracks in the ground (the so-called resumideros). These three groups of
devices do not exhaust the different interventions the delegaciones have pursued with
respect to rainwater in their area. However, they were the most consistent types of
sustainable water technologies to be present across delegaciones and for the period we
are interested in (2000-2009). As the research and discussion will make clear, this
classification is crucial due to the solutions variations along key dimensions, including
cost, system-wide effects and institutional capacity required to implement them.
Figure 12. Construction of infiltration trench in Iztacalco
filled with permeable material
Source: Delegacion Iztacalco, personal communication, 2009.
It is worth mentioning the other interventions dealing with rainwater in these
delegaciones, but it must be made clear that they are not part of our overall analysis.
These include the construction of gabion structures in highlands in Iztapalapa and Milpa
Alta, the purpose of which are to slow down the flow of water from hills into populated
areas of the city. An additional 548 of this type of structure were built in the highlands
of the DF between 1984 and 1998 (Burns, 2009). In Gustavo A. Madero, water
harvesting is being done in the Ecological Park within the ANP area designated in that
delegacion, and being used for watering. In Milpa Alta, an eminently rural delegacion,
there are eighty-seven water harvesting projects, which are used as a source of crop
irrigation. Perhaps the most innovative interventions are the water harvesting projects
in Iztacalco. These include water harvesting from the roof of the Arms Gallery, which is
recollected for future use in watering the lawns. Also in Iztacalco, a delegacion-run
small farm harvests rainwater, which it uses to clean the premises and the animals.
Finally, there exist a couple of delegaciones which have specific sewer networks for
rainwater. Unfortunately, this water ends up mixed with the rest of the wastewater in
the network (Miguel Hidalgo case) or the network is actually used by people to connect
their sewage (Xochimilco case). Except for the disappointing cases of the separate
networks, all the above-mentioned projects are steps in the right direction and will give
us some insight into issues at stake for investing in infiltration infrastructure. As we will
see, the decision process that gets these solutions implemented is subject to many
vagaries. However, a few overriding concerns create discernible patterns between the
different delegaciones.
4.2 Political and economical profiles and explanations
Before diving into the case studies, it is important to get a sense of the variation
in economical and political situations for the different delegaciones. These "systemic"
variables may offer greater insight into the patterns of technology adoption.
Unfortunately, however, this exploration yields little in the way of elegant results. As we
will see, the data points to what has been mentioned, namely that the relationship with
water supply is more than anything a measure of infrastructure in a delegacion, which,
when coupled with urban and socioeconomic data, present a panorama of reasons for
the adoption of technologies involving objective needs, but also delegacion
socioeconomic profiles, playing out in complex ways
As mentioned before, decentralization and democratization have gone hand in
hand in Mexico. In our particular case, it was also during the 2000-2003 governments
when innovations concerning water management got underway in the different
delegaciones. It would be natural to suppose certain political groups may have had a
greater influence in the advent of these decisions or at least were the vector for
innovation dispersion among the delegaciones. However, the data does not bear this out
clearly. While the dominant party in the delegaciones studied was the left-leaning PRD,
its presence does not guarantee the introduction of infiltration technologies.
Table 6. Political party in government of delegaciones studied
Delegacion Delegacion
Political Political Political constructed constructed
Party Party Party infiltration recharge
Delegacion 2000- 2003- 2006- infrastructure wells - DF
2003 2006 2009 excluding constructed
recharge recharge
wells wells
MIGUEL HIDALGO 0 0-0
IZTACALCO PRD PRD PRD 233 0-0
COYOACAN PRD PRD PRD 82 2-0
IZTAPALAPA PRD PRD PRD 29 141-0
GUSTAVO A. PRD
MADERO PRD PRD 0 0-0
ALVARO OBREGON PRD PRD 0 0-0
XOCHIMILCO PRD PRD PRD 152 15-4
TLAHUAC PRD PRD PRD 44 0-2
TLALPAN PRD PRD PRD 101 0-55
MILPA ALTA PRD PRD 0 1-3
Source: Author with data from Instituto Electoral del Distrito Federal.
As can be seen in Table 6, of the three delegaciones without any type of
infrastructure, two were initially governed by the PAN. However, the change in Alvaro
Obregon from the PAN to the PRD did not have any effect on what type of infrastructure
to build. In a similar way, Gustavo A. Madero (GAM) has all along been governed by the
PRD and no type of infrastructure has been built. This would suggest that a political
mechanism is not at play. That said, it is precisely those delegaciones with three
consecutive PRD administrations, save for the case of Milpa Alta which have all the
recharge wells.
A case could be made that being of the same party as the DF government (where
the PRD has governed since 1997), it was easier for the technology developed by the
central government to make it into those entities in which its social networks were the
strongest. However, with just this information, a case can't be made either way
regarding political factors influencing the spread of innovation. Interviews at the
delegacion level didn't reveal political party connections either, so this dimension
seems to contribute little to the explanation of the dissemination of these technologies
and, at most, could be hypothesized that it is a necessary but not sufficient condition.
Another variable that is of relevance is the percentage of a delegacion that is
actually urban. As we will see in the case studies, the measures taken in some
delegaciones, especially Alvaro Obregon and Milpa Alta, are partly a function of their
geography, since they still have vast, non-urbanized territory. As a number, the
percentage of urban land again does not tell us much if we center on delegacion
constructed infrastructure (Table 7). However, looking at recharge wells built by the DF,
they are all concentrated in the area of low urbanization. This fact can be read in two
ways. On one hand, non urbanized areas were preferred by the DF to provide a safer
source of stormwater to recharge the aquifer; on the other, infrastructure needs are
what drive the creation of these wells, assuming less urbanized delegaciones have a
greater need for dealing with their runoff. Bringing together other information (Tables
9 and 11) will provide us an even clearer picture of the mechanics present, confirming
more the latter interpretation. However, it is important to note that not all urbanization
is the same. While, for example, Miguel Hidalgo has been part of the core of the city
since the beginning of the twentieth century, other delegaciones incorporate newer
settlements, usually of illegal origin, and thus have a lower socioeconomic profile.
Table 7. Percentage of urban land in the delegacion
Delegacion
Percentage constructed Delegacion DF constructed
of Urban infiltration constructed recharge wells
Delegacion area infrastructure recharge wells
excluding
recharge
Swells _________ recharge___wells
wells
COYOACAN 100.00 82 2 0
MIGUEL HIDALGO 99.99 0 0 0
IZTACALCO 99.37 233 0 0
IZTAPALAPA 99.24 29 141 0
GUSTAVO A. MADERO 98.90 0 0 0
ALVARO OBREGON 72.88 0 0 0
XOCHIMILCO 55.15 152 15 4
TLAHUAC 43.88 44 0 2
TLALPAN 28.15 101 0 55
MILPA ALTA 9.91 0 1 3
Source: Author's calculation using ArcGIS with source information for the year 2000 from SIG, S.A. de
C.V. at MIT Geodata Repository.
With this in mind it is pertinent to look at some economic data for the
delegaciones. Tables 8 and 9 present both the budget per capita in 2005 of the ten
delegaciones studied, as well as the mean household income in 2000 in pesos. As can be
seen, again no pattern is readily noticeable; neither delegaciones with less income
present a clear building pattern, nor do those that have less or more budget allocated.
Table 8. Budget allocations per capita in 2005
Delegacion
constructed Delegacion DF
Budgga 2005 (ecait infiltration constructed constructed
D n0 exican infrastructure recharge recharge
excluding wells wells
recharge wells
IZTAPALAPA 1,284 29 141 0
ALVARO OBREGON 1,718 0 0 0
GUSTAVO A. MADERO 1,735 0 0 0
COYOACAN 1,741 82 2 0
TLALPAN 1,766 101 0 55
TLAHUAC 2,091 44 0 2
IZTACALCO 2,159 233 0 0
XOCHIMILCO 2,220 152 15 4
MIGUEL HIDALGO 3,010 0 0 0
MILPA ALTA 4,661 0 1 3
Source: INEGI, 2005; requests for public information.
Table 9. Mean household income per delegacion
Delegacion
Mean household -constructed Delegacion DFMeg noehold0 infiltration constructed constructed
Delegacion income 2000 infrastructure recharge recharge(Mexican pesos) excluding wells wells
recharge wells
MILPA ALTA 3,771 0 1 3
TLAHUAC 5,406 44 0 2
IZTAPALAPA 5,637 29 141 0
GUSTAVO A. MADERO 6,049 0 0 0
IZTACALCO 6,342 233 0 0
XOCHIMILCO 6,901 152 15 4
ALVARO OBREGON 8,420 0 0 0
TLALPAN 8,784 101 0 55
COYOACAN 9,920 82 2 0
MIGUEL HIDALGO 10,715 0 0 0
Source: INEGI, 2000 Census.
That said, it is interesting to note a couple of cases. For example, Iztapalapa,
which has the smallest budget per capita (it is also the most populous delegacion, with
1.8 million people) and is the third poorest in terms of income, is one of the
delegaciones that has most built this kind of infrastructure. In a sense, one could have
hypothesized that because poorer delegaciones may not have an infrastructure as well
developed as the richer ones, they paradoxically, may be required to invest more in
these type of solutions. However, this is not something that can be said to constitute a
pattern of any sort: witness GAM, which has a relatively low budget and is the fourth-
poorest delegacion, yet has no infiltration infrastructure. In contrast, Coyoacan, the
second-richest delegacion, has quite a few of the infiltration apparatus.
If we look at the recharge wells built by the DF, there also does not seem to be
any consistent change. The DF does not seem to have privileged either poor or rich
delegaciones. The conclusion can be that wealth either is irrelevant, or, probably, that it
may play a dual role. On the one hand it can be that poorer delegaciones need to make
up for lack of investment in services, but also, as the Coyoacan case study will make
clear, wealth and social mobilization can be correlated, allowing for wealthy neighbors
with poor urban services to organize and demand a solution to their problems.
This ambivalence regarding wealth can be further explored if we look at the
delegaciones and their distribution of wealth. It is commonly known that Latin America
has one of the worst income distributions in the world. This is true in Mexico's case,
even though cities present less inequality that the countryside (Ziccardi, 2009). If we
look at our studied delegaciones and their Gini coefficients (where 0 is perfect equality,
while 1 is perfect inequality), we see some things of interest.
Table 10. Economic inequality by delegacion.
Delegacion Delegacion DF
Gini coefficient constructed constructed constructed
Delegacion infiltration recharge recharge
infrastructure wells wells
excluding
recharge wells
MILPA ALTA 0.453 0 1 3
TLAHUAC 0.489 44 0 2
IZTAPALAPA 0.494 29 141 0
IZTACALCO 0.509 233 0 0
GUSTAVO A. MADERO 0.518 0 0 0
XOCHIMILCO 0.545 152 15 4
TLALPAN 0.577 101 0 55
COYOACAN 0.589 82 2 0
MIGUEL HIDALGO 0.605 0 0 0
ALVARO OBREGON 0.6 19 0 0 0
Source: CONAPO (2005). Figures are based on the 2000 census.
For one, inequality is highly correlated with mean income; if we compare this
table to the last, poorer delegaciones seem to be more homogeneous than richer ones
(where the mean income probably hides wide variations). There also doesn't seem to be
a clear pattern, but it is interesting to note that the two most unequal delegaciones have
not built any infrastructure mechanisms. As we shall see, this can be partly explained by
geography (Alvaro Obregon has implemented conservation programs in areas of illegal
settlements) but it could also point to certain groups without infrastructure within a
delegacion being shunned. Then again, this is not an entirely warranted observation, as
Coyoacan has quite some infrastructure and GAM, in the middle of the pack, has none.
As for Milpa Alta, it constitutes a special case given its rural profile (see case study).
Extremely unequal delegaciones may ignore some of the plight of their poorer residents
or may be dealing with water problems in other ways.
This socioeconomic information by itself does not reveal especially interesting
patterns. However, it serves to inform our analysis, especially when coupled with the
next variable to be explored. As the case studies will make clear, the worry of many of
the government officials is the lack of infrastructure to deal with stormwater. If we look
at the amount of primary sewer network (which carries both wastewater and
stormwater) per km2 of urban area in the delegacion, we get some quite interesting
results, especially when compared with the data presented above.
Table 11. Primary sewer network kilometer per km2 of urban area
Primary Delegadon Delegacion DF
sewer constructed constructed constructed
Delegacion network. Km infiltration recharge recharge
per km2 of infrastructure wells wells
urban area excluding
recharge wells
TLAHUAC 0 44 0 2
MILPA ALTA 0 0 1 3
XOCHIMILCO 0.2 152 15 4
TLALPAN 0.3 101 0 55
IZTAPALAPA 0.8 29 141 0
ALVARO OBREGON 0.9 0 0 0
COYOACAN 1.3 82 2 0
GUSTAVO A. MADERO 1.9 0 0 0
MIGUEL HIDALGO 2 0 0 0
IZTACALCO 3 233 0 0
Source: SIG S.A. de C.v. (2007); Soto-Galera, Mazari and Bojorquez, 2000; requests for public information.
If we only look at the infiltration infrastructure, no pattern emerges. However, if
we concentrate on the recharge wells we can see that half the delegaciones with the
highest amount of primary network have no recharge wells except for the two of
Coyoacan. If we consider the other delegaciones it is striking that those with low
network density that have no recharge wells of their own (Tlahuac, Tlalpan, Milpa Alta)
nevertheless have recharge wells built by the DF government.
If this information is considered in tandem with the income information
presented in Table 9, a more complete picture begins to emerge, with narratives that
connect geophysical realities (absence of infrastructure) with socioeconomic and
organizational factors. It is precisely the two delegaciones with no real primary network
which are also the two with the lowest income profiles and Gini coefficients and which
haven't built recharge wells of their own, relying instead on the DF (Milpa Alta's well
was built in 1998). Other delegaciones within the bottom half of the network density
but with a slightly higher socioeconomic profile (Table 9, Iztapalapa and Xochimilco)
take it upon themselves to build some of these structures. And still in the case of
Coyoacan, the only delegacion in the half of the group with high income, we see that its
network density is low compared to its relative wealth, thus granting an explanation of
why the delegacion there may take it upon itself to build recharge wells if they will
benefit resourceful constituents.
Thus, infrastructure network density is partially related to whether or not
recharge wells are built; but not to the building of the more general infiltration
infrastructure. This, of course, is mixed with various other variables we have explored,
namely the economic status of a delegacion, since relatively richer delegaciones with
poor primary network density seem to build recharge wells. Of course, even more
variables may intervene in explaining any particular outcome. For example, the Tlalpan
delegacion sits atop permeable strata, constituting a prime reason for the DF to place
the recharge wells there, which is not to say that this was the only reason.
Our case studies will allow us to realize with greater clarity some of the
incentives involved in the implementation of these policies and how these systemic
variables play out on the ground. For example, as our case studies will make patently
clear, the resources a delegacion population has are, at least in a pair of cases, directly
responsible for how citizens demand infrastructure. At the same time, the objective
need for infrastructure does color the way officials think of alternatives.
Flooding plays a key role in the decision to use these alternative technologies;
however, it is does not constitute a sole cause, even though it is one of the most
important, prompting many delegaciones to action, as the case studies will show.
Mexico City's annual Attention to the Rainy Season Program incorporates critical spots
within the DF that are susceptible to flooding. The program, made by the central city
government in conjunction with the programs of each of the delegaciones identifies
critical points in eight delegaciones. The 2005 program identified twenty-seven critical
points in Alvaro Obregon, Benito Juarez, Miguel Hidalgo, Gustavo A. Madero, Iztapalapa,
Tlalpan and Venustiano Carranza (Jefatura de Gobierno del Distrito Federal, 2005). As
can be seen, the array of delegaciones with flooding problems is quite varied. Of those
that concern this thesis, there are both delegaciones with no infiltration technologies
(Alvaro Obregon, Miguel Hidalgo and GAM) as well as others for which alternative
solutions have been implemented by the delegaciones (Iztapalapa, Tlalpan and
Coyoacan).
As the data above makes clear and the case studies will confirm, the interplay of
causes is quite complex. The patterns which demonstrate high dependence with
physical variables are mediated by other concerns, including level of intergovernmental
cooperation, public impact of the floods and resource level of the delegacion, among
others. As the concluding remarks will make clear, these multiple dimensions affect
decisively the incentive structure of the local governments. As such, the prospect of full
implementation of technologies that have positive externalities that address the larger
metropolitan water problematic is quite daunting.
4.3 Case studies: Solutions to be found
The ten delegaciones studied can be divided into three groups: those that have made
mostly recharge wells, with only lztapalapa in this group; those that have centered their
efforts in building infiltration trenches and perhaps some recharge wells-Iztacalco,
Tlalpan, Tlahuac, Xochimilco and Coyoacan; and those that have not built any
infiltration technologies-Miguel Hidalgo, Gustavo A. Madero, Alvaro Obregon and, with
some caveats, Milpa Alta. A brief explanation of the reasons leading to the different
choices in the delegaciones will be presented delegacion by delegacion, following the
order stated here and divided into the three groupings mentioned. The chapter will
close with a discussion that firmly establishes the patterns teased out throughout the
case presentations, namely the prime local logic behind these innovations, the scale at
which cost-benefit analysis are undertaken, and how citizen pressure, physical
characteristics, and central city aid all affect the pattern of adoption.
The trail-blazer: Iztapalapa
Iztapalapa is the most populous delegacion in the DF, with over 1.8 million people living
within its boundaries (Delegacion Iztapalapa, 2009b). It is also one of the delegaciones
with the least resources, witnessed by the fact it has the lowest budget per capita of the
ten delegaciones studied (INEGI, 2005; request for public information, 2010). As such,
Iztapalapa suffers from several water-related problems, including flooding from
stormwater and severe shortages. Indeed, both the tandeo and water by truck are a
common practice in the delegacion. Even when all wells and systems are working
properly, there is an estimated 30% deficit of water in the delegacion (Iztapalapa,
personal interview, 2009).
In this context, recharge wells have precious little to do with the fresh water
needs of the delegacion and everything with the management of urban stormwater. The
beginning of using alternative recharge technologies in Iztapalapa coincides with the
arrival of the first democratically elected delegacion president and serious flooding
events in the year 2000. As a person working in the water department for over two
decades made clear, initially the delegacion's strategy to deal with stormwater
consisted in waiting for the SACM to build up the primary network for urban
stormwater to be directed outside of the delegacion. This, however, was a very slow
process, so the delegacion, at the behest of the newly elected delegacion president,
sought to find alternatives in the face of major floods (Iztapalapa, personal interview,
2009). This is especially relevant, since, as we've seen, Iztapalapa is on the lower end of
primary network density among the studied delegaciones.
In this way, the delegacion began experimenting with resumideros, that is, with
driving stormwater to cracks within the geology, and infiltration basins. Starting in
2002, the delegacion built infiltration basins, resumideros and eventually recharge
wells. Every year between 2002 and 2009, the delegacion has invested at least $24
million pesos (upwards of $2 million U.S. dollars) in infiltration technologies.
As both the delegacion authorities and SACM authorities made clear, it was the
SACM which provides the design for the recharge wells. It is, however, the delegacion
which has put up all the money (Iztapalapa, personal interview, 2009; SACM, personal
interview, 2009). This is an extremely important observation; informal cooperation
between agencies becomes crucial for the establishment of this technology since the
SACM can provide a model to be used.
Figure 13. Flooding event in Iztapalapa
Source: Delegacion Iztapalapa, Pozos de absorci6n, June 2009, PowerPoint presentation.
Additionally, Conagua requested a presentation from the delegacion and SACM about
the technologies they were implementing (Iztapalapa, personal interview, 2009). Thus,
all three levels of government were at some point or another involved in the
implementation of the technology, even if only to make sure nothing bad was going to
happen. Though personnel at OCAVM made known their misgivings regarding the
quality of water potentially being infiltrated (OCAVM, personal interview, 2009), no one
at Conagua has seemed eager to interfere with the delegaciones' work. Cooperation,
however informal, was also quite important due to the technical competency it entailed.
Indeed, in some instances in which the delegacion has gone at it alone, authorities
ended up with infiltration basins that were "evaporation basins" (as the interviewee
euphemistically put it), indicating that the ground did not provide the capabilities
necessary for a working infiltration basin.
The delegacion has used the technology mainly as a way to avoid flooding. That
said, it is not lost on the authorities that this can be marketed as helping to recharge the
aquifer. The delegacion has actually done calculations on the amount of water captured
by its technologies (Delegacion Iztapalapa, 2009a), though it merely calculates the
rainfall within a given area the infiltration technologies service. It is far from certain
that all the computed water in this manner reaches the aquifer, though if the model
used is like the one proposed by the SACM, a 100 liter/second flow should be achieved.
At any rate, the delegacion claims the technologies have worked and point to no serious
flooding in the past 7 years (Iztapalapa, personal interview, 2009).
Iztapalapa alone among all the delegaciones has built dozens of recharge wells,
while other delegaciones have built many fewer recharge wells and have instead
focused on the cheaper infiltration trenches. Iztapalapa has been keen on adopting this
policy as a way to solve flooding problems, instead of having to wait for traditional
solutions to be built by the central city. However, this hasn't been done entirely by the
delegacion alone, which profited from the recharge well design developed by the SACM.
It is important to note that delegacion authorities, when asked what determined the
choice between recharge wells and infiltration basins, said that the space available is of
primary concern as well as how deep the well would have to be to reach permeable
strata. Thus, physical characteristics and cost (the depth of a well being the primary
indicator of its cost) also played roles in deciding between technologies. That said,
recharging the aquifers is also a constantly cited reason for the wells, both in interview
and in documents presented to the public (Delegacion Iztapalapa, 2009a), but it is never
the primary reason. Local immediate concerns play a large role in the decision, while
more communal benefits don't seem to provoke the same sense of urgency.
The cautious innovators: Iztacalco, Tialpan, Xochimilco, Coyoacan and Tlahuac
In this group we see delegaciones that also innovate regarding stormwater
management, but a wide range of motives result in differing perspectives on how best to
approach the problem. This results in differing degrees of enthusiasm in the adoption of
sustainable water management technologies.
Iztacalco
Just north of Iztapalapa is the small delegacion of Iztacalco. This delegacion is
completely urbanized, much like Miguel Hidalgo and Gustavo A. Madero. However,
unlike those entities (discussed below), the delegacion took the initiative to build
infiltration trenches. All infiltration trenches were built between 2000 and 2006. As in
Iztapalapa, the events that led to their construction were the constant flooding of major
arteries. Although according to interviewees, this problem would formally fall within
the competencies of the SACM, that institution was slow to act, so the delegacion had to
"scratch itself with its own nails" as one former Iztacalco employee put it (personal
interview, 2009).
Traditionally, flood-prone zones were dealt with by trying to canalize water to
green areas. However, it was decided that it would be easier if the problem could be
dealt with in situ since open spaces are scarce in the delegacion. Iztacalco presents an
interesting case, since this decision was brought about in part by the personal
connection between the then director of water and sewer from the first democratically
elected administration (2000-2003) and the makers of a permeable material known as
paicret. The director was able to secure a donation of the material, which was developed
by researchers at the National University (UNAM) (Rojas, 2004). As a matter of fact, the
amount of material secured by the delegacion allowed it to be used for works in the next
administration (2003-2006)( Iztacalco, personal interview, 2009).
The development of these trenches allows water to flow laterally underground.
However, as personnel from the delegacion recognized, since these are shallow
excavations and the delegacion is atop part of the impermeable layer that overlies the
aquifer, it can't really be said that the technology is recharging the aquifers, at least not
the ones used by the city for consumption. The delegacion was certainly swayed by the
availability of the material, as well as by the costs. For example, one of the most
expensive trenches built, in a major bus stop that tended to flood, cost $600,000 pesos,
nearly half of what the SACM recharge wells cost (between $1.2 and $1.5 million pesos).
According to authorities in the delegacion, all structures still work well. In all cases, the
projects involved building these trenches in public areas with heavy use, including
major arteries, soccer fields, and bus stops that tended to get flooded or swamped.
In this sense, Iztacalco shares with Iztapalapa the avoidance of floods as the
primary concern for introducing new technologies dealing with stormwater. However,
the specific contacts the delegacion personnel had led them to choose a less costly
alternative with a lower flow capacity, which was reasonable since the primary network
is already well developed in that delegacion (see Table 11). By this same token, no true
recharge of key aquifers can be expected, even if the measures taken deal with the
problems of floods.
Tialpan
Like Iztacalco and the next three cases, Tlalpan has opted for the creation of infiltration
trenches or resumideros. Tlalpan is situated in the south of the DF with most of the
delegacion on top of highly permeable strata. As a result of this, Tlalpan's many
structures are resumideros, which lead rainwater into permeable cracks in the volcanic
soil characteristic of that part of the city. Another key difference between Tlalpan and
the rest of the delegaciones is that the bulk of the SACM recharge well program took
place in this area. As authorities in the delegacion made clear, the siting of the SACM
recharge wells was done in consultation with the delegacion with regard to places that
had flooding problems (Tlalpan, personal interview, 2009).
As for infiltration infrastructures (other than recharge wells) built by the Tlalpan
delegacion, these were a response to flooding due to runoff. However, flooding episodes
seem to be more localized here, especially given the topography of the area, which is
dominated by sloping hills and mountains. Even though the delegacion was able to
control some of its flooding through recourse to the DF recharge well program, it also
took on itself to build structures that dealt with block level effects due to flooding. The
infiltration trenches were of two types. One type, built in the 2000-2003
administration, involved digging and installing 5-meter-deep boxes with holes and then
filled up with some type of permeable material. This structure, however, has performed
poorly, with constant clogging. Thus, the delegacion has made resumideros that also
collect water underground but guide it to a highly permeable crack in the geology. The
cost of these is similar to the trenches built in Iztacalco, with a $600,000 peso figure
being cited (Tlalpan, personal interview, 2009).
That said, the structures eventually get clogged, so they are closed and new ones
opened. The process is rather inefficient, which has reduced construction in recent
years. Indeed, the interviewee in Tlalpan was certain they are not an affordable solution
since so few people benefit from each resumidero. When asked about the potential
benefits this infrastructure would entail through recharging the aquifer, the response
was that if the infrastructure was.evaluated as allowing recharge, it probably would be
cost efficient, but at present the cost-benefit analysis makes it an unattractive
alternative to deal with stormwater runoff (Tlalpan, personal interview, 2009).
It is also important to point out that, according to some authorities (OCAVM,
personal interview, 2009), Tlalpan has been exploring the possibility of participating in
a state and federal program (which will be expounded more in the case of the Alvaro
Obregon delegacion) involving the restoration of ravines in periurban areas. It is worth
mentioning because it makes physical sense, given that a high percentage of the
delegacion is not urbanized (almost 70% in 2000; author calculations with data from
MIT Geodata Repository) and this alternative strategy also helps manage water flows.
However, as of 2009 we weren't aware of any programs actively undertaken by the
delegacion to this end, in contrast to other entities we studied.
Thus, in a pattern that repeats itself, Tlalpan also builds infiltration
infrastructure because of floods. At the same time, the costs are considered high and the
number of people who benefit is deemed low, so the incentives for constructing this
infrastructure have been few. Since the SACM recharge well program also allowed the
delegacion to resolve some of its most pressing flooding problems, the lack of
enthusiasm is understandable. The contrast with Iztacalco is apparent in that the
delegacion made the infiltration trenches in highly visible public areas, while Tlalpan
seems to follow more discreet placing of the infrastructures when demanded by
neighbors. Thus the construction's public impact is not as high and it makes sense that
authorities might view it as a losing proposition, even though its infrastructure density
is relatively low (see Table 11) and the DF has assumed some of the burden through its
program.
Coyoacan
As we are seeing, the public impact of this technology is key in getting it off the ground.
High impact floods may mobilize the delegaciones (Iztapalapa), as well as dictate the
siting of the technology in places that affect more people (Iztacalco). At the same time, it
is precisely the amount of pressure that citizen groups can amass that dictates in part
the implementation of these solutions. While in Tlalpan the interviewee made clear that
resumideros are a constant demand of neighbors, information from Coyoacan made
evident the true bearing that an organized citizenship can have at the local level.
The bureaucrat interviewed in Coyoacan happened to have worked before in
Tlalpan, and for him one of the salient features of Coyoacan was the activeness of the
delegacion's citizenship. According to him, while a single day without water would
result in lots of complaints in Coyoacan, in Tlalpan a week could go by without such an
uproar (Coyoacan, personal interview, 2009). This casual observation makes patent a
difference in the resources between the two delegaciones. According to the 2000
census, the mean household income of Coyoacan is the third largest for the sixteen
delegaciones, while Tlalpan is fifth (INEGI, 2000), which may translate to greater citizen
involvement in local government in Coyoacan. Coyoacan also has a greater degree of
inequality than Tlalpan, signaling the presence of rich neighborhoods within the
delegacion.
Once again, the reasons behind the creation of infiltration trenches and recharge
wells were localized flooding in areas of the delegacion when "the network is saturated
during the rainy season" (Coyoacan, personal interview, 2009). The demand for these
structures comes preeminently from neighbors. It must be noted that Coyoacan and
Tlalpan share a region known as "Pedregales" made primarily of volcanic rock, which
makes introducing stormwater drainage quite costly. Thus Coyoacan has a low
infrastructure network, especially when compared to poorer delegaciones such as
Iztacalco or GAM. As mentioned in Chapter 3, this area was the one where
neighborhoods built the first infiltration structures in the 60s to deal with rainwater
(SACM, personal interview, 2009).
In general, the delegacion prefers to build the resumideros, with an estimated
cost of $230,000 pesos (note that this figure is three times cheaper than those in
Iztacalco or Tlalpan, though the reasons for this are not clear) as compared to the
recharge wells, which have a cost of $1.1 million pesos (similar to the price given by the
SACM). When asked about the two wells built with delegacion resources in 2008 and
how the decision differed from the resumideros built in the previous years, the response
was that since in those areas there was no geological fault, the only solution was
building recharge wells, which the delegacion built in light of the constant "citizen
demand" (Coyoacan, personal interview, 2009).
If this is true, we see.that the adoption of these technologies is also a function of
neighborhood involvement. Indeed, the difference in levels of income between Tlalpan
and Coyoacan can indicate the resources different neighbor groups have, not only
economically but also socially and educationally. In this way, localized flooding events,
which don't spur delegacion authorities to action in the same way more visible ones do,
still impinge on the delegacion. This is because costs are not just economical, as the
Tlalpan interviewee put it, but also political and social, as the Coyoacan civil servant
observed.
Xochimilco
South of Coyoacan is the Xochimilco delegacion, which still has a few of the surviving
original lakes of the region. As we've been seeing in other cases, the authorities in the
delegacion used both recharge wells and infiltration trenches as a way to deal with
flooding issues. At the same time, different authorities here mentioned both the issues
of avoiding further subsidence and increasing water levels of the aquifer as rationales
for using infiltration technologies (Xochimilco, personal interviews, 2009). As in the
case of Iztapalapa, the authorities also parade the alternative benefits of the recharge
wells, although it is hard to tell if it is a post hoc form of justifying the cost of recharge
wells or whether it was factored into evaluating the different technologies.
Financially, Xochimilco authorities face similar decisions as other delegaciones.
While their infiltration trenches were priced between $140,000 and $150,000 pesos,
the recharge wells cost between $1.2 and $1.8 million pesos, depending on the depth
that had to be drilled to reach permeable strata. When asked what the criteria were to
choose between one or the other, authorities said the financial resources the delegacion
had at its disposal was key. However, it was not so much a matter of minimizing costs,
since in the analysis of this delegacion, the recharge wells are much more effective
because they can deal with a greater flow (closer to 100 liters/second) than infiltration
trenches, which have a flow capacity of 10 liters/second. Accordingly, the delegacion
was building fewer infiltration trenches and using the money to construct recharge
wells. From our analysis of systemic variables, this increased capacity certainly makes
sense for Xochimilco (contrasting, by the way, with the Iztacalco case), as it has the third
lowest primary sewer network density of all ten delegaciones, and has a higher
budgetary and socioeconomic profile.
According to authorities, the change in technology preference can be seen in
recent trends: there have been 152 infiltration trenches built since 1998. However, in
recent years the number built has been declining, while a preference for recharge wells
was maintained. In 2007, seventeen infiltration trenches and six recharge wells were
built; in 2008, nine infiltration trenches and three recharge wells were built; and in
2009, two infiltration trenches and one recharge well were built (Xochimilco, personal
interview, 2009). While this data could be read differently-after all, fewer of both
structures are being built (though the percentage decrease in infiltration trenches is
bigger)-there does seem to be a conscious decision by Xochimilco authorities to give
preference to recharge wells. This can be seen in the authorities citing the functioning of
all wells built since 2005 and the maintenance given to them twice a year.
Like the case of Iztapalapa, in Xochimilco recharge wells were built using the
prototypical design provided by the SACM at the delegaciones' behest, and through
informal cooperation, the central city checked the work done by the delegacion. Thus,
we can begin to see a pattern emerge in which cooperation with the central city
authorities is crucial for the recharge wells to be considered an option. That, however,
does not seem to be a sufficient condition, as the cases of the other three delegaciones
attest, where the cost-benefit analysis for type of infiltration device used is weighted
differently depending on citizen demand, socioeconomic profile and density of the
network.
Tlahuac
Tlahuac constitutes the final member within the group identified as having important
infiltration infrastructure built in the last decade, primarily infiltration trenches.
However, the person interviewed was less than enthusiastic regarding the prospects of
this technology. While a series of fifteen infiltration trenches with deep boxes were built
in 2001 to deal with stormwater runoff, the delegacion has chosen not to give them
maintenance. This, coupled with an urbanization process around these structures,11 has
resulted in the infiltration trenches getting clogged and becoming "giant cisterns"
(Tlahuac, personal interview, 2009). Though additional infiltration trenches have been
built subsequently, these are in highly permeable. ground in elevated areas of the
delegacion and are intended to cut water and soil runoff. It is not clear why these
structures are given maintenance and cleaning while the initial ones were left
unattended. At some level, it might have to do with changes in administration, since the
current people dealing with water arrived in 2004, after the original structures were
built. Additionally, the socioeconomic profile of the delegacion (second-most poor) may
play a role in the lack of calls for maintenance of already existing infrastructure.
In any case, the idea was also to deal with stormwater runoff in areas without
access to centralized sewer systems. Though the last two recharge wells built directly
by the SACM were situated in this delegacion, the interviewee remained skeptical of
their effectiveness. According to him, the SACM built in a place that continually became
flooded, yet within a year the structures have had clogging problems. In retrospect, it
doesn't seem the delegacion is keen on even considering recharge wells for its own use
as made clear by the fact that the wells are seen as an exclusive SACM responsibility,
even though a necessity exists based on network density.
The physical reality: Miguel Hidalgo, Gustavo A. Madero, Alvaro Obregon and Milpa Alta
Miguel Hidalgo
11 As of 2000, Tlahuac still had around 42% of its area not urbanized. (Author's calculations using ArcGIS
program with information from SIG S.A. de C.V.)
Miguel Hidalgo is the wealthiest delegacion in the DF and has been part of the city since
the beginning of the twentieth century. As such, it is a highly urbanized area and has a
well-developed, centralized sewer infrastructure. This fact is key, since the outlook of
the authorities in the delegacion was very traditional. That is, flooding problems do
occur, but according to an interviewe, it is simply a question of insufficient drainage
capacity that has to be expanded. Even then, this delegacion already has the second-
highest primary sewer capacity of our case studies (Table 11).
From this perspective, the key interventions of the delegacion are the annual
cleaning of sewer facilities to avoid clogging from dirt and trash. Usually it is also citizen
complaints of flooding in their neighborhoods which spur the delegacion into action.
However, this takes the form of sending specialized trucks to pump the stagnant water
or the debris that has blocked sewers.
Figure 14. Specialized truck for sewer maintenance
Source: Delegacion Miguel Hidalgo, Procedimiento
Operativo Temporada de Iluvias 2009, PowerPoint
presentation.
That said, the delegacion does have some infrastructure to guide water out of
certain areas as well as a pluvial sewer in certain of its neighborhoods, which
unfortunately go to the same primary network connectors as the waste water. To the
author's knowledge, no alternative structures meant for infiltration of collected water
have been built by the delegacion. When quizzed about alternative technologies for
dealing with flooding problems, one of the interviewees simply said they didn't exist in
the delegacion, nor were there plans to build them. He said that some of the proposals
from the sewer department involved the expansion of the secondary network. However,
this has not been taken up by the delegacion since, to be effective, it would also require
an expansion of the primary network, which depends on the SACM (Miguel Hidalgo,
personal interview, 2009).
It is interesting to note that the emphasis here is on enlarging an existing
network, while in other delegaciones (Iztapalapa) the problem was framed as actually
connecting areas to the network. This small detail gives us an idea of the level of
infrastructure present in Miguel Hidalgo and why an emphasis on more traditional
approaches is used, taking advantage of what already exists there and supported by our
data on primary network sewer density. Indeed, we could conjecture this is the case for
other highly urbanized delegaciones not part of this study but with similar urban
profiles and no known infiltration structures (Cuauhtemoc and Benito Juarez). Finally, it
must be noted that the SACM is informed of the annual rainy season sewer-cleaning and
there is some cooperation with the SACM, but unlike the other cases, this cooperation is
inscribed within a very traditional view of stormwater systems.
Gustavo A. Madero (GAM)
Though Miguel Hidalgo certainly presents a profile of the traditional view of water
management and much of it can be chalked up to the infrastructure density of that
delegacion, there were other delegaciones with a similar traditional outlook but that
didn't necessarily have the same degree of urban infrastructure. This is the case in
Gustavo A. Madero (GAM). Though certainly very urban, it has areas, especially in the
north near the mountain range, with irregular settlements and absence of formal water
and sewer networks. However, by our own calculations, GAM has a density of network
just behind that of Miguel Hidalgo, which can account for the existence of the traditional
paradigm.
Like Miguel Hidalgo, GAM's annual rainy season program relies on cleaning
sewer systems and pumping water from potential flooded areas. Again, no alternative
structures to deal with urban runoff were found to exist, and the interviewee thought
that increasing sewer capacity would be the solution to episodic flooding in the
delegacion (GAM, personal interview, 2009). That said, in the northern part of the area,
which is catalogued by the DF as conservation ground, there exists a delegacion
program that seeks to harvest rainwater and use it to water the ecological park in the
area.
The traditional outlook was found to exist even though the potential to seek
alternatives exist, as testified to by the projects in the conservation grounds. In contrast
to Iztacalco, which also has a high network density, GAM has not even seen the building
of an infiltration trench. In this case, either severe flooding or a sufficiently organized
citizenship may be what's missing. It is also interesting to note that, in the
socioeconomic and politic data presented in the preceding section, GAM also shows
some atypical patterns, being relatively poor (No. 7 in wealth and No. 8 in budget per
capita; Tables 8 and 9), with the only three-term PRD government that did not result in
any type of infiltration trenches (Table 6), and yet with high infrastructure density
(Table 11). These patterns may in part be explained by the high concentration of
industry in the delegacion (second only to Iztapalapa in the number of manufacturing
firms it has among the ten delegaciones studied; INEGI, 2004), a result of partially
sharing the industrial area of Vallejo, andcan also help explain its very traditional
approach to stormwater management.
That said, if the narrative and patterns we have been arguing for in this research
are true, it would mean that a sufficiently serious flooding incident would jolt the
delegacion to seek alternative water management strategies. As it happens, at the end of
2009, a serious flood hit the delegacion when a river that runs through one of the
urbanized ravines encircling the delegacion to the north overflowed. According to
newspaper accounts, the authorities have announced a special plan for the affected
area, including the reclamation of the ravine and the river that runs through it. There
are no accounts of recharge wells, but of cleaning and reclaiming zones where illegal
settlements have reduced the size of a local riverbed (Martinez, 2010; Gonzalez-
Alvarado, 2010). If this is true, the strategy would point to an alternative for dealing
with runoff: not infiltration solutions, since in any case the sewer infrastructure density
of the delegacion is quite high, but instead intervening and rescuing ecologically
sensitive zones. This alternative strategy was actually identified in the last two cases we
will examine and points to the importance of the physical reality of certain regions
within the DF that recommend courses of action other than infiltration technologies.
Alvaro Obregon
Alvaro Obregon constitutes a delegacion which as of 2000 was nearly 28% nonurban
(authors calculations), characterized by deep ravines with running rivers. Though
Alvaro Obregon has no built infiltration technology and a low sewer density, it has
profited from the physical realities of the delegacion to deal with stormwater by
reclaiming many of the ravines in cooperation with the SACM and the OCAVM.
Additionally, some of the villages in the periurban area have made projects for water
harvesting. (Alvaro Obregon, personal interview, 2009).
In this sense, Alvaro Obregon has been following a different strategy with regard
to water than all the previous case study delegaciones. A piece of this is the reclamation
of the ravines to maintain free-flowing rivers in the lower parts of the ravine, while
marginal sewer networks lead the wastewater to the main sewer system. Thus, the
delegacion seeks to deal with wastewater and rainwater problems in a differentiated
way that preserves the natural course of rainwater, leading to cleaner water courses
and less flooding, especially of informal settlements established along these ravines. In a
sense, the policy is determined by the local ecology and how vulnerable people are
made by flooding incidents. A key element of these interventions is cooperation with
the SACM and OCAVM.
Indeed, the OCAVM has been working on a program of reclaiming rivers and
ravines within the DF. The idea would be to separate wastewater in urban settlements
near ravines from the natural course of rainwater, which would be used for
reforestation. In addition, when appropriate, recharge wells would be built near the
riverbed to increase water being infiltrated to the aquifer. According to an interview in
the OCAVM, the program would seek the cooperation of the DF and different
delegaciones with the right topographical characteristics and would funnel federal
funds to the DF, which together with DF funds would be used to restore ravines in the
DF. However, due to coordination issues between authorities, the resources at the state
level must still to be approved, and the program remained in its planning stage as of the
end of 2009 (OCAVM, personal interview, 2009).12
That said, some pilot programs have been tried. This is the case of Alvaro
Obregon, which took part in a pilot program that involved the three levels of
government, where the delegacion wasn't on its own in the formulation of this program.
In a sense, it is natural that the central city government targeted this delegacion, which
has the most ravines of all within the DF (PAOT, 2004). It is important to note that the
interview revealed little in the way of major mobilizations or flooding episodes within
the delegacion, which may also be a reason for the more "preventive" and wide-ranging
nature of the initiative, though it is accepted that informal settlements along the
riverbeds make populations there particularly vulnerable to eventual floods and land
slides.
Milpa Alta
Finally, Milpa Alta constitutes a very particular case within the DF. Though it is formally
a part of the ZMVM, Milpa Alta is an eminently rural delegacion. The entirety of the
delegacion is considered conservation ground and as such, the emphasis has been on
conservation of green areas (Milpa Alta, personal interview, 2009). The delegacion has
implemented its own ravine conservation program, which, in contrast to Alvaro
Obregon's experience, is led exclusively by the delegacion. At the same time, Milpa Alta
has also sought to be included in the larger effort coordinated by the OCAVM and DF of
rescuing and taking care of the ravines within the DF. I have grouped Milpa Alta with
the delegaciones not having infiltration structures since all the recharge wells in the
entity were built by the DF and the only other infiltration structure is a recharge well
for which no information was available, except that it was built in 1998.
The key demand of neighbors here, given the rural character of the delegacion
and its still-sparse population, has been not so much flooding incidents as excessively
fast running water, which carries debris and causes erosion. Being entirely in a
conservation area, the building of recharge wells, by law, falls squarely with the SACM,
12 A ravine restoration program was recently announced by the DF government at the end of March,
2010, with a budget of $22 million pesos. Conagua had announced the original amount to be channeled
through the DF of $100 million pesos would be reduced to $30 million pesos.
which has built three wells as part of its overall program. To counter erosion, the
delegacion has instead turned to making small, terraced stone and wood dams within
the water paths to slow down the water velocity. Since 2005, 203 such structures have
been built, complementing what local farmers already did by creating swales along
roads that would channel rainwater. The delegacion has also built eighty-seven rain-
harvesting structures that serve irrigation purposes. As part of the delegacion's ravine
program, 117 citizen committees have been formed to take care of those ravines, to
which the delegacion channels resources upon the presentation of projects from a
committee.
This final case makes clear the diversity of interventions within the ZMVM.
Together with Alvaro Obregon's case, Milpa Alta gives evidence that the physical
realities of the delegacion will have a decisive impact on the interventions that are
sought for water management. While the existence of major ravines and water courses
in both Alvaro Obregon and Milpa Alta's case have determined the approach of
ecological conservation, the eminently urbanized and dense infrastructure of Miguel
Hidalgo has resulted in a view that emphasizes traditional centralized solutions. GAM
constitutes a transition case, in which the urbanization is not as complete as Miguel
Hidalgo's but also with a highly dense sewer infrastructure and numerous industries
which may influence a traditional view of water management. This group of
delegaciones is very heterogeneous and, at the same time, shares the characteristic of
not having built any infiltration infrastructure. Their relevance in this study consists in
underlining the physical realities, which dictate in important ways different strategies
other than infiltration technologies, be it continuing with traditional approaches or
using conservation efforts.
4.4 Local solutions: Patterns of visible needs and minimizing costs
As was seen from these case studies, a pattern emerges in the adoption of sustainable
solutions at the level of the delegacion. Various mechanisms uncovered by my research
come into play with a discernible logic. The first fact to be observed is that these
solutions are only considered when a problem impinges directly on the well-being of
the delegacion, when the existing infrastructure is not sufficient and where its
expansion would be a slow or very expensive process. Local problems fuel local
solutions, though the nature of those considered may be quite different. Thus, the
relative dearth of centralized infrastructure leads to the consideration of alternatives
the delegacion can act upon.
Additionally, the alternative solutions considered are weighted primarily by
whether they directly solve an urgent problem that plagues a delegacion. Infiltration
infrastructures were built because they directly dealt with the problem of stagnant
flooding, and in certain cases (Xochimilco and Iztapalapa), because they are thought to
provide a remedy against subsidence in those areas. In the selection of solutions, the
minimization of costs is sought while taking into account physical characteristics. As a
result, many of the infrastructures chosen by the delegaciones were the cheaper
(relative to recharge wells) infiltration trenches or taking advantage of places where
water naturally percolates, either through resumideros or by taking care of ravines.
Recharge wells will then only be used if they are thought to provide enough capacity
relative to the needs for infrastructure dealing with stormwater (Xochimilco's case) or if
enough citizen pressure is used to solve flooding in a place were the only feasible
solution is a recharge well (Coyoacan).
In this sense, for many delegaciones, recharge wells never seem to be the first
choice. They have a bigger price tag and the additional benefits-recharging the
aquifer-don't directly or immediately benefit the delegacion. Those delegaciones that
have built them (Iztapalapa and Xochimilco) seem to take a broader view of the
problem: both emphasize that this technology also helps to recharge the aquifer and
thus the cost-benefit analysis justifies its use, especially if the DF has not stepped to the
plate. Indeed, if flooding problems are very localized or not seen as severe (ponding
versus flooding), many delegaciones hardly consider it worthy to use resources to
benefit relatively few people unless enough pressure is made by neighbors. Barring this,
it is major flood events or in places of high visibility where the use of alternatives is
considered seriously. Thus, geophysical realities are also mediated by organizational
incentives within the delegaciones.
In addition, the role played by the SACM is key in the use of this alternative.
Indeed all the recharge wells built followed the prototype made by the SACM. This
central city innovation has been able to "percolate" to the local level. The availability of
this option is necessary, though not sufficient, for delegaciones to adopt this technology;
it can even be seen as a sort of disincentive if the DF takes the initiative (as witnessed by
the massive intervention in Tlalpan). Indeed, it is the delegacion that asks for the well
prototype from the SACM and that foots the bill for the construction and studies
undertaken for the placement of these wells; in this sense, the SACM becomes almost a
provider of technology. Cooperation among different government levels occurs but in
an ad hoc fashion, with the delegacion having the initiative of asking for SACM
technology and without a comprehensive, DF-wide program of siting other than the one
originally developed in 2004. As we saw, the recharge wells involved not only
delegacion and DF authorities but also even Conagua, which asked for presentations on
the projects being built in Iztapalapa. Alternatively, the ravine reclamation program is
also involving authorities from the three levels of government.
The different variables and priorities within the delegaciones that my case
studies uncovered bring into focus the importance of distinguishing between the three
different infiltration technologies discussed in the "Semantics" section of this chapter.
These technologies vary along three key dimensions that play a big role both in the
choice that the delegaciones make, as well as in the larger scheme of water management
within the city. These dimensions can best be described as cost, system-wide impacts
(with regard to the aquifer) and institutional resources.
Table 12. Analysis of impact of different infiltration technologies
Infiltration
trenches,
Infiltration resumideros
Recharge wells Basins or similar
Low (between
$150,000 and
High (<$1.1 million Depends on land $600,000
Cost pesos) resource pesos)
Very low to
High if properly high depending
System-wide impact Potentially high sited on geology
Institutional resources High Medium Low
As was evident from the case studies, the actual cost of the structures plays a key
role in the cost-benefit analysis undertaken by the delegaciones. In general, the more
sophisticated the technology, the higher the cost. Though there is quite a variation in
the prices cited for the infiltration trenches or resumideros, they are still cheaper than
the recharge well, where the depth of drilling constitutes the key metric that determines
its cost, but which is always upwards of $1 million pesos.
The true insight, relevant for the entire water management system of the city,
comes from the differential systemic effects of the different technologies. Indeed,
though none of the entities (either the delegaciones or the DF) have maintained
accurate measurements of the effect of the recharge wells, this technology is the one
with potentially highest effect on the overall system, since it directly impacts aquifer
recharge. By contrast, the effects of the other two technologies on the water system of
the entire city are much more muted. The infiltration basins may or may not recharge
the aquifer depending on where they are located geographically. As for infiltration
trenches, these may have no effect whatsoever (safe for reducing floods) if sited above
the area where the aquitard is situated (as in the case of Iztacalco's trenches). That said,
in parts of the city with high permeability, the potential impact on the aquifer of these
more simple technologies (compared to the recharge wells) may be just as great. This is
particularly true of the resumideros, which, by directing stormwater directly into cracks
of highly permeable areas, may affect aquifer recharge. This effect can be potentially
hazardous given that no prior destilting mechanism is present, in contrast to the
recharge wells.
This potential aquiferwide negative impact of resumideros brings into focus the
third relevant dimension of the infiltration technologies identified: in particular, the
way they encapsulate the institutional resources needed to bring them about. The
creation of the recharge wells was a specific undertaking of the central city government,
which had the resources to create a design that took into account various factors. In
contrast, solutions that have been the exclusive undertaking of the delegaciones are
much more simple (directing water to a crack in the geology or to a basin), deal with
only one dimension of water management (avoiding floods) and generally represent the
resources that institution can muster. Iztapalapa's evaporation basin constitutes an
excellent example of this limitation faced by the delegacion level of government.
Through this analysis, it is evident that, ideally, the level of government with the
necessary resources will make technologies that can have a positive systemic impact in
the water balance of the city. The cost of these technologies then would become the
greatest obstacle in implementing them. This is especially true if, in our case,
delegaciones see no immediate benefit for implementing this policy, so some type of
cooperation strategy would be needed. However, it is only through informal
cooperation, when the delegaciones saw immediate benefits to themselves, that the
recharge wells have moved along. Institutional and organizational incentives must be
tweaked in such a way that the geophysical, economic and basinwide dimensions of
future technologies can be fully exploited to the advantage of all the entities that make
up Mexico City.
Additionally, what is striking is not only the informal cooperation that has
happened with the recharge wells program, but the very piecemeal nature of all the
programs. While different institutions propose grand strategies for dealing with water
in ZMVM, the approach in reality has been piecemeal. Naturally, authorities at different
levels are wary of embroiling themselves in legal disputes with other levels of
government. Notwithstanding the federal government's challenge to the DF direct
injection well program, authorities have taken to heart the "non-written norms" that
make governance in this matter tenable by cooperating in discreet ways in different
matters.
The polycentric model of metropolitan governance, and the reality across the
globe, point to different authorities reaching agreement on different areas of urban life
as a matter of fact. As mentioned before, this type of cooperation tends to be of a stop-
and-go nature; only when serious costs are faced are there incentives for all the parties
to reach some type of agreement. Additionally, the voluntary nature of these
agreements represents a challenge for scaling up, since getting all the parties necessary
to deal with a basinwide problem represents a challenge.
Here, I believe, lies a central lesson of the case of the recharge wells in Mexico
City. Formal mechanisms which could commit all the parties to basinwide policies that
would solve the water problem in the city would be the ideal; the Basin Council of the
Valley of Mexico could really become this instance. Unfortunately, up until the present
the political and institutional reality dictates a second-best solution for collective action
problems: government levels with higher technical capacity could develop solutions
that deal with direct problems a local government faces and simultaneously have a
secondary use that addresses the basinwide problem. This solution can afterward be
"sold" to local governments, since it attacks a central concern of those authorities. In a
sense, solutions are not scaled up, but trickle to lower levels who will be interested in
acquiring them to deal with their own local problems. This model would resemble what
has been observed in other cases where decentralization can lead to new dynamics and
ways of doing things by the central government (Tendler, 1997).
In an ideal scenario, higher levels of government become labs of innovation,
creating technologies that deal with local problems but include characteristics that have
a systemic impact. In this way, they don't directly implement a solution but they create
the right incentives for others to adopt policies that will add up to a significant,
systemwide impact. This is the insight provided by the case of the recharge wells that
we can learn and use for the future. The DF developed them as a way to increase the
natural recharge of the aquifer while helping to deal with runoff. Some delegaciones
picked them up when it became clear to them that they provided a solution to their
stormwater problems. It is also worth mentioning that in at least the Xochimilco case,
the recharge wells built by the DF probably served as displays of what the technology
could do. Of course, many delegaciones' cost-benefit analysis (already developed
primary network, few beneficiaries) and lack of civic participation resulted in
alternative paths being chosen which were economically and politically cheaper. That
said, this does not invalidate the insight and, if anything, gives us an idea of the
incentives that may be used by higher levels of government to get local levels excited
about a certain technology or policy. For example, this insight probably tells us that the
federal government should have used its experience with the Texcoco recharge well to
develop a number of specifications for the technology which could be adopted by the
city government, instead of battling the DF project in the courts. The regulations
published in 2009 are a step in this direction but sell short possible interventions. The
federal government could contribute to allow for a model with certain specifications to
be adopted across the ZMVM.
Of course, the effectiveness of the solution is key. In various delegaciones
(Tlalpan, Xochimilco and Tlahuac), the authorities said that some of the recharge wells
built by the DF had experienced clogging problems. According to the literature, life
cycles of recharge wells and infiltration trenches are usually five years, with twenty
years cited as a maximum (Ellis, 1997; Kresic, 2009). They are also subject to
mounding13 problems, which decrease their efficiency.
In Mexico City's case, two concerns exist, in addition to the normal limits of the
technology. First, the placement of the recharge wells is a key concern. As we have seen,
the clay strata overlaying the aquifer is of very low permeability, and infiltration
trenches built in this area will have no effect on the aquifers used by the city (Iztacalco
being a prime example for being in its entirety over the aquitard). Though many of the
recharge wells were built in areas outside the clay strata, a few are within. Though flow
tests and the depth of the wells (as much as 60 meters in some cases) would imply that
water is actually reaching the aquifer past the clay layer, it is still not clear how the flow
would behave. Since the recharge wells are holed, it wouldn't be obvious what the water
flowing down would do when coming into contact with the aquitard. The clogging
problems detected by some delegaciones could be due to normal clogging but also to
mounding effects.
Second, the cleanliness of the water actually infiltrated is also of concern. The
cases of the widespread resumideros are a particularly egregious example of solutions
that may jeopardize the cleanliness of the aquifer. In the case of recharge wells, though
the infrastructure includes specific designs to settle solids and tentatively separate oils,
there is no information about how effective these mechanisms are. Indeed, for big storm
events, many of these mechanisms would be bypassed. This can be especially dangerous
in heavily urbanized areas near "hotspots" (such as gas stations) that could end up
causing more harm than good. In many cases, authorities have tried to put the wells on
high ground, where runoff hasn't yet accumulated too many pollutants before entering
the recharge well. To a certain degree, these are risks present in any infiltration
structure, and agencies in other countries have clashed over the dilemma between
promoting infiltration and protecting groundwater quality (Thomas and Robinson,
13 Mounding refers to the process by which water creates a mound directly under the well as a result of
low permeability, which prevents water from dispersing itself uniformly.
1997). Indeed, this is how the concern of Conagua can be interpreted, both when it
halted the injection project and when it asked for reports on the recharge wells.
Unfortunately, information on the performance of the technology is simply anecdotal,
since not even SACM has been able to have widespread readings on the amount of water
effectively flowing through the wells. This lack of information constitutes a central
problem which makes recommending the policy difficult. If the first stage in any urban
planning project is the compilation of relevant information, this lack of information
constitutes an obstacle that will be difficult to surmount.
Given these caveats about this technology, its functiona relevance is quite
limited. As discussed above, the estimated amount of additional infiltration flowing to
the aquifer if all the DF program was implemented is not negligible (0.5 m3/s), but it's
far from what is needed for solving the problem of water in Mexico City. As mentioned
at the beginning, the technology is far from a panacea but the story of its
implementation can be quite useful going forward.
In the end, the pattern of adoption of recharge wells leaves us with many lessons,
some on local decision-making dynamics but also some regarding sustainability and
metropolitan governance more generally. These include:
- Local governments have an overwhelming incentive to only look for sustainable
solutions to problems that have an immediate effect on their welfare, especially if
the problem is widespread.
- The solutions chosen, sustainable or otherwise, depend on a cost-benefit analysis
which includes political considerations of the size of the impact of the solution, or
who it is impacting, and how efficient a certain solution will be compared to its
price (from our systemic analysis, poorer delegaciones seemed more reticent
spending on costly recharge wells.) The broader the benefits are framed (including
aquifer recharge) the more likely recharge wells are chosen, though it is difficult to
say if the framing is done before or after the decision was made.
- Physical realities are important. The relative water availability by delegacion was in
reality an indicator of sewer infrastructure in general. Lack of centralized
infrastructure led authorities to consider alternatives, while delegaciones with well-
developed infrastructure took a more traditional approach. In the case of
delegaciones with important green areas (Milpa Alta and Alvaro Obregon), the
solutions dealt overwhelmingly with the rescue of ravines and river courses.
Delegaciones on top of particularly permeable strata (Coyoacan, Tlalpan) favored
the creation of resumideros.
The study of these cases has provided us with a road map of sorts for the
implementation of sustainable solutions. As we have seen, the impetus for the
development of solutions to local problems does not guarantee that these will be
sustainable in a broader context. Though the relative absence of centralized
infrastructure becomes an incentive to develop new solutions, these will be heavily
dependent on cost-benefit considerations that may ignore the broader context. Thus,
the role of the central city, as a metropolitan authority of sorts, takes a central
importance as the developer of answers which deal with local and regional problems
simultaneously.
The recharge wells' expansion thus provides a deeper understanding of how
problems should be tackled in a fragmented metropolitan context. Though their
effectiveness is still subject of debate, anecdotal evidence suggests recharge wells do
provide a valuable service which benefits only delegaciones where the deficit of
infrastructure and sufficient public necessity (through political pressure or disaster)
lead to a favorable cost-benefit analysis. The lessons from the implementation of
different infiltration structures in the DF can give us guidelines for how the broader
water problems within the ZMVM could be addressed effectively. The broader
implication of these cases for water management in Mexico City will be dealt with in the
conclusion.
Chapter 5. Conclusion: Innovation that percolates
This thesis began with the question of why the different delegaciones in Mexico City had
or hadn't adopted a technology which seemed in line with IWRM and helpful in solving
the water problems within the city. As we noted, these decisions were taken in very
specific circumstances, with a democratic and decentralizing process modifying key
institutions within the ZMVM. Thus, the literature used to frame the problem was both
from works dealing with decentralization and metropolitan governance, as well as
IWRM and sustainability more generally.
If we were to pose ourselves the question of whether decentralization has helped
increase the sustainable management of water in the ZMVM and the VBM more broadly,
we could reply that it certainly has stopped the growth of the hypothetical city-region
Kuznet curve, but we are far from "turning the curve." As recounted in Chapter 2, the
loss of political centralization has deprived the DF of resources it historically used to
shift its environmental burden to other basins. Indeed, the cancellation of the fourth
stage of the Cutzamala system was precisely due to the municipal and social
mobilization in the areas were the aqueduct was to be built. However, in this new
scenario, Mexico City suddenly finds itself without many options, in a fragmented
institutional environment where a successful and congruent water management
structure, plan and policy are still far off. The clash between the federal government and
DF over injection wells is an example of how this fragmentation has decisively affected,
in a negative manner, the search for solutions to water issues in the city.
That said, our study of the different delegaciones offered important insights into
the question. A first realization is that infiltration mechanisms are a much broader
category than uncovered by the preliminary research. This was important because the
relative impacts of different structures vary. For example, infiltration basins require lots
of land, while trenches and resumideros are relatively cheap, but their overall impact
(pollution and recharge-wise) is more ambiguous. Recharge wells, by contrast, seem to
offer greater flow capacity, have in place structures that destilt the water and, due to
their depth, can actually recharge the aquifer. However, they can be as much as ten
times more costly than some of the other alternatives.
Having this as our departure point, the analysis of key variables and the
interviews in the ten different delegaciones made it quite clear that local concerns are
what primarily drives the adoption of these technologies. Economic factors don't seem
to offer much insight if they are not considered in conjunction with the central element
of not having a well-developed infrastructure to deal with stormwater. It is not water
scarcity, but infrastructure scarcity, manifested through flooding episodes, which drive
the delegaciones' evaluation of the problem. A key finding was that major flooding
episodes or in places that affect many people (major road arteries or bus stops) jolt
delegaciones into action. Alternatives are explored especially when they know certain
areas would have to be connected to the main sewer network, which may be costly and
take quite some time since it depends on a central city agency. In many cases where the
flooding is more localized, the sense of urgency is not present and delegacion officials
many times see no point in investing in infrastructure that is only going to benefit a few
families. Organized neighbors which can demand that the delegacion deal with the
problem, however, may challenge this logic. Indicators of wealth and inequality point to
the existence of these groups, which when underserved but having important economic
clout can make things happen. Indeed, that is how Coyoacan got its only two recharge
wells.
Thus, the cost-benefit analysis for deciding which infrastructure to use, if any,
involves more than price tags. Political considerations are evident in the degree to
which flooding affects the population and, if it is localized, the degree to which
neighbors can bring pressure upon the authorities. Judging by our results, this is more
likely in places that have greater economic resources, as discussed in the comparison
between Coyoacan and Tlalpan. There does seem to be a bias to minimize costs, which
makes recharge wells seldom a first choice. Those delegaciones that made a conscious
commitment to building them (namely Iztapalapa and Xochimilco) took a broader view
of the problem. On the one hand, there was again a local rationale, in that recharge wells
can deal with greater flow than other structures and may also help with subsidence
problems. However, authorities also highlighted the potential benefits for the aquifer.
Though it is difficult to know for certain whether the comprehensive effects were taken
into account when making the decisions, the bottom line remains that a broader
understanding of the overall water situation in the city is related to choosing
technologies that can have this potential impact.
That said, research also uncovered the existence of alternative strategies that are
related to a certain degree with the physical and infrastructure realities of a delegacion.
For example, physicality impacts the infrastructure decisions in Tlalpan and Coyoacan
since they have geological structures which allow widespread use of resumideros, a low-
cost alternative to a recharge well. Two additional strategies, different from any type of
infiltration structure construction, were identified. Both were influenced in part by
physical and infrastructural realities. One consisted in following the traditional
approach, whereby no new structures are built and the main response to flooding is
using sewer cleanup machinery; and the other is conservation and restoration of
riverbeds and ravines that have been encroached upon in delegaciones that still have a
portion of unurbanized territory.
The traditional outlook was found in one of the most thoroughly urbanized
delegaciones: Miguel Hidalgo. This view, however, was not exclusive of that delegacion.
Even entities such as GAM, with irregular settlements and lack of connections to the
network, but a high primary sewer network density, had an employee espousing
traditional approaches. However, reality has a way of imposing itself and recent
flooding events made that delegacion consider the possibility of restoring degraded
riverbeds, much as major floods jolted Iztacalco (having the highest primary sewer
network density) to look into infiltration trenches. The adoption of conservation
strategies, specifically when it comes to the ravines in the periurban area, was evident
in those delegaciones not fully urbanized that can better manage water through this
intervention. In particular, both Alvaro Obregon and Milpa Alta had experience with
ravine restoration and upkeep, and in both cases, the interventions were not driven, as
far as we know, by important floods as in the rest of the delegaciones studied.
A key finding was also the level of cooperation existing among the three levels of
government. Formal interactions do exist, to wit, the coordination of the sewer cleaning
programs between delegaciones and the SACM and, more recently, the ravine
restoration program which uses federal and central city funds and involves the
delegaciones. However, in the specific case of infiltration technologies, the coordination
has been much more difficult and actually takes an informal character. The uptake of
recharge wells on the part of the delegaciones was applying a tool developed by the
SACM for a specifically planned intervention. Delegaciones found recharge wells useful
to deal with flooding problems, even though they were originally presented as a unit for
aquifer recharge. My research uncovered that the SACM's location of the wells also took
into account delegacion reports of areas prone to flooding. In this sense, we get an idea
of how the innovation came from the central city government but was taken up by
delegaciones seeking alternatives to their problems. Indeed, the initial DF plan and its
use in certain delegaciones may have had a "demonstration" effect, which the literature
finds is key to the diffusion of innovation (Hill, 2004; Kelman, 2005). Of course, other
delegaciones chose different paths based on the analysis factors mentioned previously,
but it is important to keep in mind the role of the central city as innovator and
delegaciones as adopters of recharge wells under the right conditions.
The federal level was also present, although in a passive role and contributed in a
way by not interfering with these structures, as it had when it challenged the DF's idea
of injecting treated wastewater. If looked upon in a positive light, the government was
watching out for the "commons" by being concerned for the health of the aquifer. This
translated into both the legal challenge but also in asking for presentations on the
functioning of the recharge wells. A less positive reading on this would see the nature of
the relationship as quite ambiguous and navigated by "non-written norms" (as a
Conagua member put it), which allowed these structures to go up even as no regulation
existed on stormwater infiltration to groundwater.
This cooperation, sometimes uneasy, between the three levels of government,
brings us to a broader point on what this study means for the greater decentralization
and sustainability literature and for the specific policy implications on water
management in the city. What is evident is that the incentive structure provided by a
local vision, which decentralization could be argued to promote, does not allow for
sustainable policies to flourish per se. Of course, the argument could be made that
decentralization will promote sustainability by "facing-off' communities. Indeed, the
greater power afforded to municipalities was what allowed communities in the
Cutzamala basin to stop the fourth stage of the aqueduct project to Mexico City. If
everyone is looking for their local interests, then municipalities will make sure that the
environmental burden of others won't be put on their shoulders. However, this outcome
does not account for more diffused burdens that may first need to reach a critical stage
before local interests are evidently jeopardized. Indeed, innovations in our study were
accounted for by the very local interest of preventing floods. The added benefit of
recharging the aquifer was definitely a secondary worry for the delegaciones.
In this sense, mechanisms that could be established for localities to come up with
solutions that solve their immediate problems and regional problems are suggested by
this study. Recharge wells were innovations that allowed addressing local problems and
regional ones and were developed by the SACM, the institution that precisely had a
more global view of the problem as a citywide organism. It would make sense, then, that
the cost of developing such innovations was absorbed by this level of government,
which has the regional view incentive, and "marketed" to the delegaciones.
In a couple of delegaciones, the interviewees mentioned tentative projects or
ideas of using the rainwater on the roofs of multifamily developments to channel it to
the recharge wells or to harvest it. Similar ideas have been put into practice in other
parts of the world (Daji Limaye, 2007). It would certainly represent another form of
reducing storm runoff, and even, depending on the nature of the project, help solve
water deficits in certain delegaciones which, at the end of the day, are expected by the
people to take responsibility for the water services in their locality.
The thing is, these ideas and nebulous projects have not been crystallized by the
delegaciones. The limited economic and political capacity of the delegacion as such
make it less willing to undertake, unaided, such ventures. In this sense, the central city
government has the opportunity, guided by the example of the recharge wells, to
develop infrastructure that directly impacts the delegacion without the need to be in
charge of building it if the costs and benefits it provides can convince the delegaciones
by themselves to use it. In this way, decentralized solutions that can counter the
diseconomies of centralized water systems (OECD, 2009) would be disseminated
throughout the city. Certainly the DF might need to undertake some pilot projects to
have a demonstration effect, but the water situation in the city is such that
infrastructure that could simultaneously deal with excessive runoff and provide some
relief to the water shortages would have a chance at being implemented at the
delegacion level.
This division of tasks in the water management of the city would address the
difficulties we have seen in this study. In a certain sense, it also stands on its head the
notion of "bottom-up" approaches. Instead, what is being called for is the percolation of
sustainable types of solutions toward lower levels of government. Higher levels of
government have the incentive to deal with problems that generate externalities over
local boundaries. Regulation is one of the ways that authorities have tried to deal with
the problem, but it rarely solves anything, especially if enforcement mechanisms are
weak and informality is a constant feature, as is the case in Mexico. Another approach,
then, is that this level of government should come up with actual solutions that deal
with the externalities AND with the immediate effects. Instead of being held responsible
for implementing them, a huge task which may surpass its capacities (and for which
decentralization was probably thought of as a good idea in the first place), this design
may be tested and delegaciones can buy into it. Local governments would certainly have
an incentive if a technology deals with local, immediate problems, and by implementing
it, the positive externalities of the technology would allow it to serve the larger
metropolitan interest.
This is not to say that the solutions would be quickly and uniformly adopted. The
research in this thesis falsifies such a conclusion. As we have seen, physical
characteristics, personal connections, citizen pressure, and how wide the frame of
reference used by decision makers is, have important bearing on these decisions.
However, taking into account these factors using what was learned in the course of this
research can provide important insights into the nature of the solutions that actually get
implemented. This proposal is far from being recentralization in disguise. On the
contrary, it enlists higher levels of government in increasing the options of local
governments in an attractive way for both parties.
5.1 Some recommendations
Based on the previous discussion, two alternatives can be thought of for
presenting this solutions to local governments. One possibility is a completely "hands-
off" approach by which the SACM establishes in conjunction with a university or
research center a department dedicated exclusively to developing technologies that
have these dual systemic and local effects. The technology would present such
immediate and obvious benefits for the delegacion that it would be adopted by the
localities with minimum effort on the part of the SACM which would only be the
provider of the innovations.
If we use a little imagination, and the reader grants us some leeway, a possibility
could be envisaged of standardized rooftop water harvesting systems fitted for large
buildings in the vicinity of flood-prone areas, which would seem to address many of the
factors this study has emphasized. Capturing rain on rooftops would reduce the flow of
stormwater in these flood-prone areas, therefore reducing a problem faced by the
delegacion. If the water is actually used by the occupants of the building, it would
reduce primary water consumption, which the delegaciones receive complaints about
when there is not enough. A large building would make the impact more visible and
thus economically and politically more palatable to the delegacion. Finally, the
"standardized" bit addresses the previous planning and design made by the central city
government, which would reduce uncertainty in its adoption by delegaciones. This
solution is, of course, purely speculative. It probably has many setbacks and formal
economic, financial and engineering analysis would need to be undertaken. However,
some of the characteristics needed to succeed in its implementation in the case of
Mexico City are specified and can serve as a basis for successful interventions.
Alternatively, the "selling" of these types of solutions may require additional
incentives for the delegacion that bring into line organizational and geophysical
realities together with general water management needs. Subsidy programs for the
adoption of these types of technologies would probably go a long way to guaranteeing
this, though direct subsidies would be difficult to implement. A promising alternative
would be offering discounts on the water charges of those localities willing to invest in
this infrastructure. This mechanism would be easily implemented since water charges
are controlled by the DF. In addition, it has the potential to mobilize the support of other
actors (in essence any water consumer) who would be benefited by this measure. Of
course, this recommendation can be counterproductive if not carefully implemented,
since lower prices promote waste. To avoid this, the charge reduction could be applied
to a predetermined quantity of water, after which further consumption would be
100
charged according to the normal tariff structure. In this way, formal incentives for
sustainable water technology implementation can be established.
Of course, the above analysis should be heavily qualified by the fact that this
thesis has left a lot of ground for research and further questions to be answered. Our
study of only ten delegaciones leaves uncovered unknown factors that could be present
in the other six jurisdictions. This study has also taken a view of the entire delegacion.
More fine-grained information, at the neighborhood level, would probably reveal more
specific patterns, since the delegaciones are not uniform throughout, even though it is at
the delegacion level were the implementation decisions are taken.
Additionally, our perspective has been an eminently government-institution one.
This is the potential agent of urban livability, so to speak, that we have focused on.
However, this leaves a huge opening for researching the way that other actors may
influence water policy and sustainability more broadly, including citizens (which we
briefly touched upon) as well as the private sector and NGOs. All of these actors also
influence the way decisions are arrived at by different governmental levels. Finally,
when dealing with recharge wells per se, the lack of information on their performance
(the amount of water that flows through them, their quality, and so on) constitutes a
major problem, since it is difficult to quantify their effectiveness other than by
anecdotal reports of "it still works" or "it gets clogged sometimes." A serious policy
advocating recharge wells would need more detailed information than what authorities
have been collecting about them.
That said, the mechanisms uncovered for the adoption of this technology
constitute real insights into how water problems can be tackled in the long term in
Mexico City. Though the realization that water problems in Mexico City will require
novel ways of thinking and getting things done is present, change is always hard to
implement. Together with many other cities around the world, Mexico City faces a
challenge that cannot be put aside any longer. Local and city governments have
important tools at their disposal that can be used to help solve this problem. Making
wise use of them will be one of the keys to solving the perennially looming water crisis.
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Appendix. Water Balances for VBM, ZMVM and DF
Table 1. Water balance and supply and discharge for the Valley of Mexico Basin
Water Balance .Valley of Mexico Basin (VMB)
Rainfall
Conagua, 2009 700mm - 214.7m 3/s - 6771.2hm 3
Flores et al., 2009b 6,969.45hm3 - 221m 3/s
OF WHICH
1) Infiltration
Conagua, 2009 750.7hm 3 - 23.8m3/s
Morales and Rodriguez, 2009 751hm 3 - 23.8 m3/s
Flores et al., 2009b 693.7hm 3 - 21.9m3/s
2) Evapotranspiration
5274.19hm 3 - 167.2m 3/s (derived by
Conagua, 2009 author)
Flores et al., 2009b 5,234.97hm3 - 166m 3/s
3) Runoff
Conagua, 2009 746.31hm 3 -23.7 m3/s
Flores et al., 2009b 567.64hm 3 - 18m 3/s
ADDITIONAL SOURCES
Imports
Conagua, 2009 614.95hm3/ 19.5m 3/s
Morales and Rodriguez, 2009 622hm 3 - 19.7m 3/s
Exports
Conagua, 2009 1,589.4 hm3 - 50.4m3/s
Flores et al., 2009b 1, 576hm 3 - 49.9m 3/s
Water supply and discharge
Supply of first use water
Conagua, 2009 2, 582.80hm3 - 81.9m3/s
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Morales and Rodriguez, 2009
OF WHICH
1) Groundwater from basin
Conagua, 2009 1,876.39hm 3 - 59.5m 3/s
Morales and Rodriguez, 2009 1,702hm3 - 54m 3/s
2) Springs and surface water in
basin
Conagua, 2009 91.45hm 3 - 2.9m 3/s
Morales and Rodriguez, 2009 241hm 3 - 7.6m 3/s (derived by author)
3) External sources
Conagua, 2009 614.95hm 3 - 19.5m 3/s
Morales and Rodriguez, 2009 622hm 3 - 9.7m 3/s
OF WHICH
a) Lerma
Conagua, 2009 161.15hm 3 - 5.11m 3/s (derived)
b) Cutzamala
Conagua, 2009 453.8 hm3 - 14.39m 3/s
Treated Water
Conagua,2009 NA
Morales and Rodriguez, 2009 359hm 3 - 11.4m 3/s (reuse, irrigation)
"Water discharged 1 ,-r,.,,,
Conagua, 2009 1,589.4 hm 3/ 50.4m3/s (mean)
Flores et al., 2009b 1, 576hm 3 - 49 .9m3/s
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2, 565 hm 3 - 81.3 m3/s
Table 2. Water balance and supply and discharge for the ZMVM (the precise area defined as
ZMVM differs among authors)
ZMVM
Rainfall
2,548.10 hm3 -
Birkle et al., 1998 80.8m 3/s
OF WHICH
1) Infiltration
13 - 18 m3/s if
including leakages
Birkle et al., 1998 another 9.5m 3/s
2) Evapotranspiration
Birkle et al., 1998 54 ~ 59 m3/s
3) Runoff
Birkle et al., 1998 7. 6m 3/s
Water supply and discharge
Supply
Perl6 and Gonzclez, 2005 68 m3/s
Carrera-Hernndez and Gaskin, 2009 62m 3/s
Birkle et al., 1998 60.3m 3/s
OF WHICH
1) Groundwater within the ZMVM (some numbers
may include basinwide resources)
47m 3/s (including
Perl6 and Gonzalez, 2005 PAI)
Skaggs, Vail and Shankle, 2002 51m 3/s
Ortega-Guerrero, 2008 50m3/s
40.8m 3/s (using
Carrera-Hern ndez and Gaskin, 2009 values from 90s)
Birkle et al., 1998 51.35m 3/s
2) Springs and surface water
Perl6 and Gonz~lez, 2005 1.3m 3/s (just DF)
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Carrera-Hernndez and Gaskin, 2009
Birkle et al., 1998 1.4m3/s
3) External sources
Perl6 and Gonzalez, 2005 21.7m3/s
Skaggs, Vail and Shankle, 2002 23m 3/s
Carrera-Hernndez and Gaskin, 2009 19.8 m3/s
Birkle et al., 1998 15 .9m 3/s
OF WHICH
a) Lerma
Perl6 and Gonzilez, 2005 6m 3/s
Carrera-Hernndez and Gaskin, 2009 5.8m 3/s
b) Cutzamala
Perl6 and Gonzalez, 2005 15.7m 3/s
Carrera-Hernndez and Gaskin, 2009 14m 3/s
Treated Water
Birkle et al., 1998 4.3m3/S
Water discharged
1,797.09hm 3_
Conagua, 2009 56.9m3/s
GDF, 2007 40m 3/s
Perl6 and Gonzclez, 2005 45m3/s
Skaggs, Vail and Shankle, 2002 40m 3/s
Carrera-Hernndez and Gaskin, 2009 54m 3/s
OF WHICH
1) Rain
Carrera-Hernndez and Gaskin, 2009 11.2m 3/s
2) Wastewater
Carrera-Hernndez and Gaskin, 2009 42.8m 3/s
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1.4m3/s
Table 3. Water balance and supply and discharge for the DF
Water Balance Distrito Federal (DF)
Rainfall
Conagua, 2008b 937 mm
OF WHICH
1) Infiltration to aquifer
GDF, 2007 209 hm3 - 6.6m 3/s
2) Evapotranspiration NA
3) Runoff NA
Water supply and discharge
supply
Conagua, 2008b 1,123hm3 35.6m3/s
GDF, 2007 1,009.15hm3 -32m 3/s
Per6 and Gonz~lez, 2005 35.1m 3/s
D vila and Constantino, 2007 32m 2/s
OF WHICH
1) Groundwater within the DF and
surrounding areas
GDF, 2007 16m 3/s
Perl6 and Gonzblez, 2005 20.1m 3/s (includes PAI)
Divila and Constantino, 2007 22m 3/s
2) Springs and surface water
GDF, 2007 NA
Perl6 and Gonzalez, 2005 1.3m 3/s (includes private wells)
Divila and Constantino, 2007 0.8m3/s
3) External sources
GDF, 2007 15.04m 3/s
Per6 and Gonz&lez, 2005 15m 3/s
D vila and Constantino, 2007 8.4m3/s
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OF WHICH
a) Lerma
Conagua, 2009 3.83m3/s
GDF, 2007 4.16m 3/s
Per6 and Gonzalez, 2005 5m 3/s
b) Cutzamala
Conagua, 2009 NA
GDF, 2007 11.2m 3 /s (derived by author)
Per6 and Gonzalez, 2005 10 m3/s
Treated Water
Conagua, 2009 3.4m3/s
GDF, 2007 2.5m 3/s
Water discharged
Per16 and Gonz~lez, 2005 25 m3/s
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